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THE LONG ARC OF DIVERSITY BENDS TOWARDS EQUALITY: 
DECONSTRUCTING THE PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF WORKPLACE 
DIVERSITY EFFORTS 
 
Stacy L. Hawkins

 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Workplace diversity efforts have many critics.  More notable perhaps than 
the attack from the right in the form of legal challenges alleging workplace 
diversity efforts amount to reverse discrimination is the normative critique of 
workplace diversity efforts from the left.  Progressive responses to workplace 
diversity efforts range from cautious ambivalence to highly suspicious. This 
article deconstructs this progressive critique of workplace diversity efforts 
and in the process identifies two primary strands of opposition, one 
principled and the other practical.   The article responds to this critique by 
situating workplace diversity efforts within the context of their equal 
employment opportunity origins and by highlighting their beneficial effects 
for women and racial minorities.  This response reveals the true progressive 
concern as less about how workplace diversity efforts are justified in 
principle than about how they might operate in practice.  Taking this 
pragmatic concern seriously, this article relies on theories of law and 
organizational theory to suggest that Title VII law and doctrine should be 
interpreted and applied by courts in response to workplace diversity efforts 
in ways that promote their equality-enhancing effects and otherwise restrict 
their potential to incur the kinds of practical harms that most concern 
progressive scholars. 
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“The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”  
– Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A person of color is photo-shopped into an otherwise all-white 
brochure touting an institutional commitment to diversity.
1
 A Black 
employee who lives in an all-white suburban neighborhood is forced 
to commute across town to manage a store in an urban Black 
neighborhood.
2
 One candidate is selected over another of the same 
race because he is less “ethnic.”3 These hypotheticals exemplify the 
claim often made by many “progressive” scholars 4  that workplace 
diversity efforts
5
 (“WDE”) are more harmful to those who ought 
                                                     
1
 Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2153 (2013). 
2
 JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW 
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 87 (2013). 
3
 DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN 
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 136–38 (2013) (this example has been modified slightly 
from the original to conform to the hypothetical presented at the end of this article, 
see infra Part IV.B.1.). 
4
 The term “progressive” has been used in the legal literature to denote a scholar who 
advocates for social justice through liberal interpretation of laws bearing on equal 
opportunity for underrepresented groups, including in particular women and racial 
minorities. See Soohan Kim et al., Progressive Corporations at Work: The Case of 
Diversity Programs, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 171, 175 (2012). In the 
context of Title VII, “progressive” scholars include those who advocate for 
affirmative action in employment. Id. The term “progressive” is admittedly 
imprecise in designating a wide-ranging group of scholars. Id. However, this term is 
used herein as a shorthand because of its common association with this broad liberal 
or progressive ideology. See Jack R. Weinstein, On the Meaning of the Term 
Progressive: A Philosophical Investigation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 49–50 
(2006). Despite the disagreement with the general progressive critique of WDE 
expressed herein, I consider this article a contribution to that body of progressive 
scholarship. The disagreement is a matter of means, not disagreement with the end of 
achieving social justice on behalf of women and racial minorities. 
5
 WDE can involve a wide range of activities, including recruitment and hiring of 
diverse employees, managing supplier diversity initiatives, and sponsoring employee 
affinity groups, among other things. See Stacy Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of 
Diversity: Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a Twenty-First 
Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75, 82 (2012) [hereinafter 
Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity] (describing modern workplace 
diversity efforts). These efforts are most often motivated by instrumental business 
concerns rather than remedial or egalitarian concerns. See id , 84-90 (describing 
these instrumental concerns as leveraging cultural competence, increasing innovation 
and demonstrating social responsibility). The focus here is exclusively on those 
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instead to be its beneficiaries, and therefore these efforts ought to be 
condemned in principle and/or curtailed in practice.
6
 It is true that 
WDE can sometimes go awry in practice, causing unintended and in 
some cases even harmful consequences, as demonstrated by these 
examples.
7
 However the progressive critique of WDE as problematic 
in principle or deserving of categorical rebuke ignores the many ways 
they foster equal opportunities in the workplace, particularly for 
women and racial minorities.
8
 These equality-enhancing effects, often 
ignored or minimized in these critiques, have become all the more 
important for promoting the workplace interests of women and racial 
minorities as robust enforcement of anti-discrimination laws designed 
to curb workplace discrimination has waned in recent years.
9
  
 
This article responds to the progressive critique of WDE by 
suggesting a more hopeful consideration of their potential to aid in the 
progressive project of transforming workplaces from places of 
inequality into places of both diversity and equality. In other words, 
despite some occasional missteps, if we were to follow the long arc of 
WDE, we would find that, on the whole, they do in fact move 
workplaces towards equality rather than away from it. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                             
WDE that are directed towards employees and that might implicate employer 
liability under prevailing anti-discrimination law. Although some might elide the 
distinction between WDE and affirmative action, this conflation misses the mark 
between these two distinct phenomena both as a matter of legal and practical 
significance. See infra Parts II.A.1–2.; see also Stacy Hawkins, How Diversity Can 
Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard: Mounting an Effective Title VII Defense 
of the Commitment to Diversity in the Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2457, 
2460 n.9 (2015) [hereinafter Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell 
Douglas Standard] (discussing the difference in treatment under Title VII of WDE 
and remedial affirmative action plans). Thus, throughout this article, the term WDE 
signifies instrumental workplace diversity efforts and is used in contrast with 
remedial affirmative action. 
6
 See infra Part III.A. 
7
 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
8
 See infra Part II.B. All references herein are to race and/or racial minorities. 
However, it is acknowledged that many of the same issues involving race and/or 
racial minorities addressed herein could equally apply to ethnicity and/or ethnic 
minorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2012) (acknowledging that Title VII protects 
workplace discrimination on the basis of national origin to the same extent it protects 
race and gender discrimination). 
9
 See infra Part III.C. 
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rather than the broad, principled rejection of WDE found in the 
literature, progressive scholars ought to seek productive ways to 
leverage the equality-enhancing potential of these efforts by focusing 
the critique more narrowly on those practical aspects of WDE that 
might have equality-suppressing effects. This paper outlines that more 
targeted normative approach. 
 
This article is divided into three parts. Part One provides a 
primer on WDE, emphasizing in particular the points of divergence, 
and a critical point of alignment, with traditional, remedial affirmative 
action.
10
 The account of WDE provided highlights the erroneous 
assumptions that lay hidden beneath the surface of the progressive 
critique, as well as the unacknowledged benefits generated by WDE 
for women and racial minorities in particular.
11
  
 
Part Two first synthesizes then deconstructs the progressive 
critique based on this fuller account of WDE. This part reveals that 
these efforts are more allied with the equality goals underlying Title 
VII than the progressive critique admits, suggesting the possibility that 
WDE might prove more helpful in the cause to advance workplace 
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities than this critique 
acknowledges.
12
 
 
Finally, Part Three addresses some of the legitimate practical 
concerns raised by the progressive critique of WDE. Drawing on 
theories of law and organizational theory that explain how Title VII 
law has responded to these efforts to date, this Part offers some 
prescriptions for how Title VII law and doctrine can be interpreted and 
applied in response to WDE to ensure its continued alignment with the 
equality goals underlying Title VII.
13
 
 
I. WORKPLACE DIVERSITY VS. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A PRIMER 
 
WDE are characterized by policies and practices designed to 
expand opportunities for and inclusion of all persons in the workplace, 
                                                     
10
 See infra Part II.A. 
11
 See infra Part II.B. 
12
 See infra Part III.A–C. 
13
 See infra Part IV.A–B. 
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but they especially target those persons who are, or traditionally have, 
been underrepresented, such as women and racial minorities.
14
 
Accounts differ about the exact origins of WDE, but there is universal 
agreement that they have proliferated over the last several decades.
15
 
In their earliest form WDE were more closely and explicitly aligned 
with equal employment opportunity (EEO) compliance, but as they 
expanded WDE have transcended these EEO origins.
16
 Having once 
been justified largely in terms of EEO compliance, WDE are now 
pursued predominantly for instrumental business reasons.
17
  
A. Diversity & Affirmative Action: Materially Different But 
Critically Aligned 
 
Importantly, WDE differ materially from traditional 
affirmative action plans.
18
 The most widely-cited difference is that 
                                                     
14
 See, e.g., Inclusion at Starbucks, STARBUCKS.COM, 
http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community/diversity-and-inclusion (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2016). In this way, WDE resemble the pursuit of student body 
diversity. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (discussing the 
fact that while the university recognizes “many possible bases for diversity 
admissions,” there is “special reference to the inclusion…of African-Americans, 
Hispanic and Native American[] [students who otherwise] might not be represented 
in [the] student body in meaningful numbers.”). 
15
 Compare Kim et. al, supra note 4, at 186 (claiming, as is often cited, that WDE 
date to the 1980s), with Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental 
Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. 
REV. 677, 704 (2004) (claiming that WDE emerged as early as the late 1960s). See, 
e.g., Patrick S. Shin and Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 
1049 (2011) (noting it is “beyond doubt” that “diversity initiatives on the part of 
private employers have expanded over the past few decades.”). 
16
 See infra Part II.A.3. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Although some scholars treat WDE as merely one form of affirmative action, see, 
e.g., Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification and Workplace Affirmative 
Action, 43 BRANDEIS L. J. 199, 233–34 (2005) (referring to the instrumental 
diversity rationale as a form of “private affirmative action”), others have defined 
affirmative action as distinctly remedial in nature, and distinguishable from WDE, 
see, e.g., Monique C. Lillard et al., The Effects of the University of Michigan Cases 
on Affirmative Action in Employment: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Meeting, 
Association of American Law Schools, Sections on Employment Discrimination, 
Labor Relations and Employment Law and Minority Groups, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 127, 146 (2004) (noting “I have not seen a Supreme Court decision yet that 
gives us a definition of what affirmative action is…[but] I tend to think about 
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WDE are justified by forward-looking, instrumental rationales; 
whereas traditional affirmative action plans are justified by a 
backward-looking, remedial rationale.
19
 Another significant distinction 
between the two is the difference between the explicit racial and 
gender preferences emblematic of traditional affirmative action plans 
and the inexplicit race- and gender-consciousness of WDE.
20
 These 
are important and often overlooked distinctions.
21
 But WDE’s origins 
in EEO compliance offers a critical point of alignment with 
affirmative action that similarly goes unacknowledged in the 
progressive critique.
22
 
 
EEO compliance arises out of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of 
race and gender, among other things.
23
 Enacted against the historic 
                                                                                                                             
affirmative action in terms of a plan that takes race and sex into account as one 
factor as a remedy for past, present, or continuing discrimination.”). 
19
 See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 79 (“Suddenly 
corporations were awash in diversity programming focused on diversity recruiting 
and hiring, affinity groups, and supplier diversity initiatives, among other things.”); 
see also Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 215, 216–17 
(2004) [hereinafter Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work] (describing the diversity 
rationale as instrumental and forward-looking rather than remedial and backward-
looking); Corey Ciocchetti & John Holcomb, The Frontier of Affirmative Action: 
Employment Preferences & Diversity in the Private Workplace, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
283, 320–21 (2010) (distinguishing between the remedial rationale and the “forward-
looking” diversity rationale); Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter’s Open 
Doors: What the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Mean for Race-
Conscious Government Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2005) 
(describing the “forward-looking” and “instrumental” rationales of diversity as 
contrasting with the “moral justification” of remediation underlying affirmative 
action). 
20
 See infra Part II.A.2. 
21
 Id. 
22
 See infra Part II.A.3. Even the EEOC has acknowledged the nature of both these 
differences and this critical alignment between diversity and the workplace equality 
goals of Title VII. EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL 915.003: EEOC COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL § 12-I: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (2008).  
2323 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). Title VII also prohibits discrimination in 
employment based on color, national origin and religion. Id. Other legal bases exist 
for enforcing the guarantee of non-discrimination in employment, including Section 
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (which governs racial discrimination only) and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Although these other laws 
raise legitimate concerns for their application to WDE, treatment of WDE under 
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backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement, and with the goal of ending 
Jim Crow segregation in the American workplace, it is no surprise that 
Title VII is believed to embody not just a general prohibition on 
discrimination in hiring and employment on the bases proscribed by 
the statute, but also a normative commitment to ensuring workplace 
equality for women and racial minorities specifically.
24
 It is this latter 
goal that progressive scholars believe WDE frustrate, or even betray.
25
  
1. Instrumental Diversity & Remedial Affirmative Action 
 
In contrast with Title VII’s indisputably remedial purpose to 
correct and prevent workplace discrimination,
26
 modern WDE are, 
more often than not, justified in instrumental business terms such as: 
(1) ensuring responsiveness to culturally diverse markets, (2) 
improving performance through innovation; and (3) signaling the 
openness of the workplace to both internal (employees) and external 
(customers/other stakeholders) audiences.
27
 Sociologist and self-
                                                                                                                             
Section 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause is beyond the scope of this article.  For 
a discussion of the interaction between WDE adjudicated under Title VII and those 
adjudicated under the equal protection clause, see Hawkins, How Diversity Can 
Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra n. 5 at 2465, n. 41 (noting “courts 
have often treated [workplace discrimination] claims arising under both Title VII and 
equal protection doctrine the same.”). 
24
 See generally J. EDWARD KELLOUGH, UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 
POLITICS, DISCRIMINATION AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (2006) (discussing the 
history of affirmative action in the public and private sectors including its legal 
aspects) 
25
 See infra Part II.A.1. 
26
 See generally KELLOUGH, supra note 24. 
27
 See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 84–90 
(discussing each of these instrumental interests and designating them the 
business, functional and social responsibility rationales respectively). This 
emphasis on instrumental goals does not mean that WDE are not, or cannot 
be, justified in moral, remedial, or social justice terms as well, or motivated in 
part by these concerns. Id. There is, for instance, in the legal profession, an 
ongoing debate about the competing force of the “business case” versus the 
“moral case.” See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell 
Douglas Standard, supra note 5, at 2459. Additionally, many modern 
corporate diversity programs are aligned with their corporate social 
responsibility efforts, demonstrating that businesses recognize both the 
instrumental and social value of WDE. See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense 
of Diversity, supra note 5, at 88. Increasingly, however, the “business cases” 
has come to dominate the managerial rhetoric regarding the value of WDE. 
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described progressive John Skrentny denotes the difference between 
WDE and affirmative action as one between an employer’s belief in 
“racial realism” (i.e., WDE) and its commitment to “affirmative action 
liberalism” (i.e., affirmative action).28 Skrentny identifies two different 
strands of racial realism or WDE: (1) a belief in “racial abilities,” and 
(2) a commitment to “racial signaling.”29 The racial abilities strand of 
racial realism parallels WDE’s instrumental concerns for responding 
to diverse markets and improving business innovation.
30
 The racial 
signaling strand aligns with WDE’s instrumental concern for signaling 
the openness of the workplace.
31
 Skrentny contrasts the “racial 
realism” associated with WDE with the more approving “affirmative 
action liberalism,” which emphasizes redressing inequality and 
ensuring equal opportunities.
32
 This perceived fundamental disjunction 
between WDE on the one hand and affirmative action on the other 
hand reflects the broader progressive critique of WDE as diametrical 
to the goal of workplace equality.
33
  
 
WDE are not, however, antagonistic to the goal of workplace 
equality; to the contrary, they are allied with that goal.
34
 A statement 
on Starbucks’ corporate website reflects and underscores how WDE 
and their instrumental goals transcend, without diminishing, the goal 
of equal opportunity:  
 
At the heart of our business, we seek to inspire and 
nurture the human spirit - understanding that each 
                                                                                                                             
See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
28
 SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 3. 
29
 Id. at 11. 
30
 Id. According to Skrentny, “racial abilities” refers to the productive use of race 
through the “common [practice] of racial matching…when it comes to dealing with 
clients or citizens of the concordant race” or for creating racially diverse groups to 
“generate more ideas and thus more innovation, more productivity, and better overall 
performance.” Id. 
31
 Id. at 13. Skrentny defines “racial signaling” as the use of race to “gain a favorable 
response from an audience through the strategic deployment of an employee’s race.” 
Id.  
32
 Id. at 6. 
33
 See infra Part III.A.1–2; see also Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity Contributes to 
Equal Opportunity, S. CAL. L. REV. 2 (forthcoming 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2620545 (positing that instrumental diversity is 
“orthogonal, or even hostile to equality”). 
34
 See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
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person brings a distinct life experience to the table. 
Our partners are diverse not only in gender, race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, religion and 
age, but also in cultural backgrounds, life experiences, 
thoughts and ideas. 
Embracing diversity only enhances our work culture, it 
also drives our business success. It is the inclusion of 
these diverse experiences and perspectives that create 
a culture of empowerment, one that fosters innovation, 
economic growth and new ideas.
35
 
As this statement demonstrates, despite deliberate attention to racial 
and gender inclusion in the workforce, contemporary WDE often do 
not directly seek to realize Title VII’s remedial goal of redressing 
workplace inequality.
36
 They emphasize instrumental business 
concerns.
37
 Nevertheless, these efforts do promote more inclusive 
work cultures and foster greater workplace equality.
38
  
 
2. Race & Gender Conscious, NOT Racial & Gender Preferences 
 
Another material difference between WDE and affirmative 
action is that WDE are merely race- and gender-conscious, but 
employment decisions need not and ought not be based expressly on 
the race or gender of candidates.
39
 By contrast affirmative action is 
typified by explicit racial and gender preferences.
40
 The progressive 
critique elides this important distinction, but it has material 
consequences for how WDE ought to be administered in practice and 
how they are treated in law.
41
 
                                                     
35
 See Inclusion at Starbucks, STARBUCKS.COM, 
http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community/diversity-and-inclusion (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2016). 
36
 See supra note 19 (distinguishing between the remedial goals of affirmative action 
and the instrumental goals of WDE). 
37
 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
38
 See infra Part II.B. 
39
 See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
40
 See infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
41
 See infra Part III.A. 
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Traditional, remedial affirmative action plans are most often 
associated with racial and gender preferences, as exemplified in the 
seminal Title VII cases United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber
42
 and 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency.
43
 Weber approved of a union 
training program that reserved half of the available training slots for 
Black steelworkers in an attempt to remedy past discrimination in the 
union trades.
 44
 In sustaining this training program against challenge, 
the Supreme Court held that Title VII permits employers to adopt 
voluntary affirmative action plans that involve explicit racial 
preferences when they serve to remedy past discrimination by 
eliminating a “manifest racial imbalance” in the workforce. 45 
Subsequently, in Johnson the Supreme Court upheld affirmative action 
plans involving explicit gender preferences.
46
 
 
By contrast WDE do not depend on, and ought not involve, 
explicit racial or gender preferences.
47
 Rather, WDE entail race- and 
                                                     
42
 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
43
 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
44
 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
45
 Id. 
46
 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641–42. In Johnson, a male challenged the 
promotion of a female and the employer defended the selection on the ground 
that the employer was operating pursuant to an affirmative action plan 
designed to cure a gender imbalance in its workforce. Id. The Court approved 
the affirmative action plan based on the gender imbalance of the workforce, 
i.e., none of the positions in the job category were held by women. Id. at 637–
38. The EEOC ultimately issued regulatory guidance for employers on how to 
take advantage of the “safe harbor” established under Title VII when adopting 
voluntary affirmative action plans pursuant to the standards articulated in 
Weber and Johnson. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608 et seq. (setting forth the regulations 
for voluntary affirmative action); see also EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL 
915.003: EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-VI.C: RACE AND COLOR 
DISCRIMINATION (2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf. 
47
 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. Nor are they race and gender exclusive. 
See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 82. This broad 
scope raises another progressive objection to WDE, i.e., that they dilute the focus on 
workplace equality for women and racial minorities. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, 
Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 
1219 (2011) (addressing the issue from a feminist perspective on workplace 
protections for women).  Responding to that objection is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it is notable that WDE still generate workplace equality benefits for 
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gender-conscious efforts designed to increase the presence of various 
underrepresented groups in the workplace, including specifically 
women and racial minorities, as well as ensure a more inclusive work 
culture as a means of leveraging this diversity and inclusion for 
instrumental benefit.
48
 Notwithstanding their race- and gender-
consciousness, properly administered WDE are careful to avoid 
explicit racial and gender preferences, or any efforts that may be 
exclusionary rather than inclusionary.
49
 Creating both more diverse 
and more inclusive workplaces is, after all, the means by which 
employers realize the instrumental benefits of WDE.
50
 
3. A Common Origin in EEO Compliance 
 
Despite these material differences, affirmative action and WDE 
do have a critical point of alignment.
51
 WDE, like remedial affirmative 
action plans, have origins in the management of EEO compliance.
52
 
Although some scholars date the origins of WDE as far back as the 
                                                                                                                             
women and racial minorities specifically despite their broad scope. See infra Part 
II.B. 
48
 See supra note 27. In fact, when WDE employ explicit racial and gender 
preferences they are most likely to go awry and create the kinds of unintended 
consequences that most concern progressive scholars. See infra Part III.A.2.  
49
 Compare Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a 
reverse discrimination challenge to the employer’s workplace diversity plan 
where the plan prohibited decision-makers from expressly considering race or 
gender in individual hiring or promotion decisions even though it encouraged 
and rewarded managers for their efforts to improve workplace diversity), with 
Decorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming a jury verdict in 
favor of the white plaintiff challenging a diversity plan and finding it was not 
error for the trial court to treat the diversity plan as an invalid affirmative 
action plan where the employer used racial preferences in an attempt to 
achieve a desired racial balance within the workforce). For a fuller discussion 
of why racial and gender preferences ought not be employed as a part of 
WDE, see Hawkins, supra note 5, at 2478–79. 
50
 See generally Michalle E. Mor Barak, Inclusion Is the Key to Diversity 
Management, But What Is Inclusion?, 39 HUM. SERV. ORGS.: MGMT., LEAD. & 
GOVERNANCE 83 (2015). 
51
 See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
52
 For a general discussion of the history and origins of WDE, including their 
relation to the EEOC, see Kim et al., supra note 4; see also Hawkins, A Deliberative 
Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 80–81. 
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1960’s,53 the more common account locates the origins of WDE in the 
1980’s. 54  As administrative enforcement and attention to EEO 
compliance under Title VII waned during the Reagan Administration, 
human resources professionals “rebranded the programs they had built 
for EEO compliance as part of a new ‘diversity management’ 
initiative.” 55  These nascent diversity efforts, initially designed to 
sustain EEO compliance, were soon bolstered in their importance 
when the “mega” discrimination cases of the 1990’s demonstrated the 
huge liability corporations could face for failing to adequately prevent 
workplace discrimination,
56
 and as the business management literature 
began to offer empirical proof that diverse, heterogeneous workforces 
were better for business than non-diverse, homogenous ones.
57
  
 
These factors, coupled with the growing demographic diversity 
of the labor force and the globalization of economic markets that made 
cultural competence an indispensable skill in the twenty-first century 
workforce,
58
 caused WDE to transcend their origins in EEO 
                                                     
53
 See, e.g., Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 15, at 7 (arguing that WDE emerged as 
early as the late 1960’s in response to the race riots). 
54
 See Kim et al., supra note 4, at 173 (explaining that while companies began 
recruiting women and minorities in the 1960s, formal diversity programs did not 
emerge until the 1980s). 
55
 Id. at 186. Coincidentally, due to the political appointment of federal judges, this 
shift in the political climate might also explain the judicial retrenchment on robust 
remedial enforcement of Title VII. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
56
 See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 81–82 
(describing the 1996 $176.1 million Texaco settlement and the ensuing 1999 $192 
million Coca-Cola settlement of race discrimination charges as watershed events that 
precipitated the rapid rise of the diversity movement in corporate America); see also 
Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 367, 367–68 (2008) (describing the proliferation of diversity initiatives 
after settlement through consent decree of “megacases” of employment 
discrimination). 
57
 See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 86 (describing 
the emergence of the business and functional cases for diversity). For a fuller 
discussion of the functional benefit, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE 
POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS AND SOCIETIES 
(2008) (demonstrating empirical link between diversity, including social identity 
diversity such as race and gender, and work tasks such as problem-solving and 
prediction that allows diversity to be a value-added benefit in the workplace). 
58
 In 1987, the Hudson Institute released its influential publication, Workforce 2000, 
predicting the rapid diversification of the American labor force. See Frymer & 
Skrentny, supra note 15, at 705–06. See also Brief for 65 Leading American 
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compliance and develop into the instrumentally-justified and widely-
embraced management practices they have become today.
59
 WDE are 
now largely justified in instrumental terms, rather than by the legal 
compliance justifications that characterized their EEO origins.
60
 But 
this does not mean that instrumental WDE have become completely 
unmoored from these EEO origins.
61
 They continue to make 
workplaces more equitable and inclusive even as they have become 
increasingly justified in instrumental terms.
62
  In fact, it may be that 
the instrumental value for workplace diversity has become dominant, 
not in spite of, but because of its ability to remain allied with 
diversity’s broader equality origins, making WDE consonant with 
rather than antagonistic to the equality goals underlying Title VII.
63
 
B. Diversity Fosters Workplace Equality  
 
This fuller account of WDE’s origins and operation, often 
unacknowledged in the progressive critique, demonstrates how WDE 
                                                                                                                             
Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516) [hereinafter Brief for 65 Leading American 
Businesses] (arguing that the skills needed in the increasingly global economy 
included cultural competence). 
59
 See Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity, supra note 5, at 80–82; see also 
Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 
AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1590 (2001) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the 
Managerialization of Law] (describing how WDEs both evolved out of and have 
helped influence EEO compliance). The proliferation of WDEs was also no doubt 
spurred by endorsement from the EEOC, the administrative agency charged with 
enforcement of Title VII. See EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL, supra note 46 
(approving of “diversity efforts designed to open up opportunities to everyone”). 
60
 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and 
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6 (2005) 
[hereinafter Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work] (observing that “the public posture of 
[employers] has shifted over the last few decades away from [EEO] compliance and 
social justice and toward ‘diversity’” and achieving its “economic benefits.”). 
61
 See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
62
 See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, 
supra note 5, at 2459 (discussing the debate between the “moral case” and the 
“business case” for diversity in the legal profession). Employers commonly 
reference these equal opportunity and inclusion goals alongside the instrumental 
goals. See id. Employers commonly reference these equal opportunity and inclusion 
goals alongside the instrumental goals. See id.  
63
 See infra Part III.A.1. 
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and affirmative action efforts are aligned.
64
  Moreover, there is ample 
evidence that WDE do promote workplace equality for women and 
racial minorities despite their express goal of improving business 
performance.
65
 This should not be surprising considering the 
instrumental benefits sought by employers can often only be achieved 
if workplaces actually become both more diverse and also more 
inclusive.
66
 Targeted recruitment efforts, for instance, increase the 
hiring and promotion of women and racial minorities while at the 
same time identifying new sources of talent that aid in business 
innovation.
67
 Similarly, programmatic diversity initiatives designed to 
foster inclusion, such as mentoring and affinity groups, are credited 
with improving work cultures for women and racial minorities while 
also driving innovation and enhancing the employer’s reputation for 
inclusion with key stakeholders.
68
  
 
Still critics claim that WDE generate little or no benefit for 
women and racial minorities, often pointing to mixed empirical 
reviews of diversity to support this claim.
69
 While it is true there are 
                                                     
64
 See infra Part III.A.1. 
65
 See Kim et al., supra note 4, at 206 (citing study showing that “‘identity-
conscious’ human resource practices…are associated with greater gender and racial 
diversity in the ranks of management….by closely monitoring personnel 
decisions…and by ‘making special efforts to employ and promote the career 
progress’ of minorities.”); see also Lisa H. Nishii, The Benefits of Climate for 
Inclusion for Gender-Diverse Groups, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1754, 1768 (2013) 
(demonstrating that inclusive work climates increase unit-level engagement and 
satisfaction by women and reduce turnover); E. H. Buttner et al., Diversity Climate 
Impact on Employee of Color Outcomes: Does Justice Matter?, 15 CAREER DEV. 
INT’L 239, 249 (2010) (finding that organizational practices facilitating workplace 
inclusion correlate with high levels of job satisfaction and low turnover for 
employees of color). 
66
 See generally PAGE, supra note 57 (explaining that diverse workgroups only 
generate greater business innovation when the demographic differences among 
groups translate into differences of skill and experiences that can be leveraged in 
problem-solving); see also Barak, supra note 50, at 87. 
67
 See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, 
supra note 5, 2479–81 (discussing the Rooney Rule, its impact on the diversity of 
the NFL, and how it has been recommended for adoption in the legal profession). 
68
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 314; see also Kim et al., supra note 4, at 
207–08 (observing that mentoring programs have positive benefits for women and 
minorities in management). 
69
 Lisa L. Broome et al., Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board 
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 765–67 (2011) (describing empirical evidence on the 
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studies purporting to demonstrate negligible benefits accruing to 
women and racial minorities from WDE, these studies often have 
narrow findings and are contradicted by other data and studies 
demonstrating that WDE do generate significant workplace benefits 
for women and racial minorities.
70
 Critics often cite a 2006 study by 
Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelly as proof that WDE 
generally have no appreciable benefit for women and racial 
minorities.
71
 Instead the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly merely study 
concludes that diversity training specifically is not particularly helpful 
for improving advancement opportunities for women and minorities.
72
   
However, the study also finds that other WDE, such as mentoring, fair 
better in this regard.
73
 Most important, the study finds that employers 
who adopt diversity management structures with accountability for 
WDE significantly improve advancement opportunities for women 
and racial minorities in the workplace.
74
  Not only are the beneficial 
                                                                                                                             
benefits of diversity as “mixed”); Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the 
Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 1632 (suggesting some diversity efforts 
are effective while others are not). 
70
 See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
71
 Tessa L. Dover et al., Diversity Policies Rarely Make Companies Fairer, and They 
Feel Threatening to White Men, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 4, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/01/diversity-policies-dont-help-women-or-minorities-and-they-
make-white-men-feel-threatened (describing the Kalev, Dobbin and Kelly study as 
“[a] longitudinal study of over 700 U.S. companies [finding] that implementing 
diversity training programs has little positive effect and may even decrease 
representation of black women.”). 
72
 See Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy 
of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 590, 594–
95, 611 (2006). Importantly, this study was limited to evaluating only a handful of 
diversity practices, including diversity committees/task forces/managers, manager 
evaluations, diversity training, networking programs and mentoring programs. Id. at 
590. The study was further limited by measuring the efficacy of these programs only 
in relation to the increased representation of women and minorities among 
management. Id. This finding of the limited utility of diversity training programs is 
not surprising considering these programs are not designed to improve advancement 
opportunities for women and racial minorities. See id. at 604. Rather, they are 
designed to improve work cultures by reducing bias. See id. 
73
 Id. at 607 (showing mentoring programs have positive effects which are 
strengthened by robust accountability structures). Indeed, this study was later 
referenced by Kalev & Dobbin as showing only that some of the most popular 
corporate diversity programs . . . fail to produce tangible, on-the-ground results.” 
Kim et al., supra note 4, at 204.  
74
 Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 607. 
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effects of WDE acknowledged in the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study 
itself, they are also demonstrated in a number of other empirical 
studies.
75
 This research on the beneficial effects of WDE offers strong 
proof of their value for improving equal opportunities for women and 
racial minorities even when, and perhaps precisely because, they are 
justified in instrumental rather than remedial terms.
76
 
 
II. THE PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF DIVERSITY 
 
Despite the demonstrated improvements in workplace equality 
they generate, and the enthusiastic embrace by employers, progressive 
legal scholars have frequently criticized WDE.
77
 Often failing to 
acknowledge their EEO origins, or credit their equality-enhancing 
effects, progressive legal scholars have focused instead on the 
instrumental justifications for WDE and examples of their potential 
harms to assail them as both antithetical in principle and incompatible 
in practice with the goal of workplace equality underlying Title VII.
78
 
                                                     
75
 See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 4, at 607; Barak, supra note 50, at 87; Nishii, 
supra note 65, at 1763–64; Buttner et al., supra note 65, at 249. 
76
 See Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 
1632 (suggesting that the instrumental bases for WDEs might actually make them 
more effective than equal opportunity efforts undertaken for legal compliance 
reasons).  
77
See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 15, at 719 (noting despite widespread adoption 
of WDEs, they have “few supporters in the academic and legal community”); but cf. 
George H. Taylor, The Object of Diversity, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 653, 657 (2014) 
(objecting to Leong’s critique of diversity specifically by positing, “she is mistaken 
that there is a disjunction between the basic sense of rightness…and the 
implementation of diversity.”). Taylor offers a cogent account of diversity’s 
potential to instantiate workplace equality stating, “diversity at its best serves not 
only the goal of institutional participation by people of color, but also a recasting, 
through this participation, of institutional norms.” Id. at 674.  
78
 See, e.g. Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 26 (expressing 
approval of the diversity rationale only insofar as it aspires to integrative ends, rather 
than merely instrumental ends, and further expressing concern that the instrumental 
ends might override these integrative ends and thwart the egalitarian purposes of 
Title VII); Norton, supra note 19, at 545–47 (acknowledging that despite the turn to 
instrumental rationales many questioned whether this “signaled a retreat from 
articulating the moral justification for affirmative action….to avoid addressing 
directly the barriers of race and class that adversely affect so many [in the 
workplace]” and only embracing these rationales to the extent they signal a rejection 
of a “racial caste system”); Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work: 
“Diversity,” Discrimination and Integration, 59 EMORY L. J. 585, 598 (2010) 
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However, this critique ignores the material differences between WDE 
and affirmative action that make WDE less likely to be harmful in 
practice when properly administered, while at the same time 
disregarding the critical alignment between the two that makes them 
more compatible in principle than progressives acknowledge. By 
identifying these errors in the progressive critique, this Part reveals 
that WDE are neither incompatible with the workplace equality goals 
underlying Title VII in principle; nor are they necessarily harmful to 
the interests of women and racial minorities in practice.
79
  This part 
demonstrates how WDE have the potential, if properly circumscribed, 
to aid in the progressive project of advancing workplace equality, 
particularly on behalf of women and racial minorities.
80
  
A. An Overview of the Progressive Critique 
 
The progressive critique of WDE opposes them both in 
principle and in practice and can by summarized into the following 
objections: (1) WDE’s instrumental rationale(s) are antithetical to the 
equality principle underlying Title VII;
81  
(2) WDE’s instrumental 
rationale(s) are incompatible with the remedial scheme of Title VII;
82
 
                                                                                                                             
(noting that because equality and integration are not dominant themes in the 
instrumentalist arguments in favor of WDEs, they are “likely to entrench rather than 
destabilize inequality in organizations” especially when used to organize work, 
rather than at the moment of entry into the workplace and should be permitted only if 
aligned with broader integrative efforts pursuant to Title VII.); Cheryl L. Wade, “We 
Are An Equal Opportunity Employer”: Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1541, 1548 (2004) (explaining that WDE discussions often fail to deal with 
“difficult problems of discrimination and racism”). 
79
 See infra Part II.A. 
80
 See infra Part II.B. 
81
 For instance, in describing the diversity rationale in the employment context, 
Cynthia Estlund described it as “decidedly not a remedial argument; it is 
instrumental and forward-looking. It is not about making up for the sins of the past, 
but about making a better future.” Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 
216. 
82
 See Rebecca H. White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of 
Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 269 (2004) (arguing that instrumental diversity is in 
tension with Title VII’s remedial scheme); see also Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 
supra note 19, at 218 (suggesting that WDE are only permitted if they incorporate 
integrative with instrumental aims); Green, supra note 78, at 621 (urging courts not 
to recognize instrumental justification for WDE without alignment with the remedial 
purpose of Title VII). 
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(3) WDE exploit, rather than benefit, women and racial minorities;
83
 
and (4) WDE essentialize and/or entrench, rather than destabilize or 
disrupt, harmful gender and racial stereotypes.
84
 Following a general 
overview of each of these discrete objections, I highlight the ways 
progressive legal scholars articulated these objections to WDE in 
doctrinal terms in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, in which the Court expressly approved of a 
university’s interest in student body diversity based in part on the 
instrumental benefits that accrue to employers in the form of students 
who are “better prepare[d] for an increasingly diverse workforce.”85 
Despite judicial endorsement of the instrumental value of diversity in 
the educational context, many progressive legal scholars expressed 
skepticism that the Court would (or should) similarly embrace this 
instrumental diversity interest in the employment context under Title 
VII.
86
  
1. Diversity as Antithetical to Equality  
 
The first, and perhaps most fundamental, objection progressive 
scholars have raised in response to the rise of WDE is that these 
efforts are simply antithetical to the equality aims of Title VII.
87
 This 
rejection of WDE in principle is based on a belief that the underlying 
                                                     
83
 See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 219 (suggesting that the 
“business case for diversity” is problematic in “echo[ing] employers’ discredited 
efforts to cite discriminatory ‘customer preferences’ under Title VII.”); see also 
Leong, supra note 1, at 2165. 
84
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 73 (framing the problem of working 
identity in terms of “essentialism”). 
85
 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. At issue in Grutter was whether the University of 
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions plan justified by instrumental 
concerns for student body diversity rather than remedial concerns for remedying past 
institutional discrimination could withstand challenge under the strict scrutiny 
standard applicable to race-based equal protection claims. Id. at 328. The Court 
found that achieving the educational benefits of student body diversity was 
sufficiently compelling to justify a university’s race-conscious admissions plan. Id. 
at 328. This holding was subsequently affirmed in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
86
 See infra Part II.B. This skepticism and hostility towards WDE can be contrasted 
with the general embrace of instrumental diversity in the context of higher education 
admissions. See e.g. Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 220 (treating 
the Grutter diversity interest favorably even while critiquing WDE). 
87
 See supra note 88–91 and accompanying text; see also Rich, supra note 33, at 2 
(describing WDEs as “orthogonal, or even hostile to equality”). 
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instrumental rationales make these efforts unsuited to the task of 
achieving the social justice goal of workplace equality underlying 
Title VII.
88
 Illustrating this belief in the fundamental disjunction 
between diversity and equality, Skrentny argues that in the turn 
towards the instrumental management of WDE, “significant 
opportunities and values [have been] lost.”89 In particular, Skrentny 
laments that this shift in emphasis away from a more remedial, non-
discrimination approach and toward instrumental diversity 
“sacrifice[s] the consensus goal of equal opportunity” that underlies 
the enforcement of Title VII.
90
 Stephen Rich similarly argues that 
“[p]hilosophically, diversity contradicts basic principles of 
antidiscrimination law” because it rejects the remedial rationale for 
pursuing equality in favor of an instrumental one.
91
 
 
This view that WDE are incompatible with, or even 
antagonistic to, workplace equality for women and racial minorities 
fails to acknowledge WDE’s EEO origins, or the fact that in many 
ways WDE have continued to enhance workplace equality and 
promote greater workplace inclusion even as they have transcended 
these EEO origins.
92
 Consequently, WDE and equality are neither 
inherently nor necessarily incompatible.
93
 Rather the equality-
enhancing effects of WDE can be reconciled with the equality 
principles underlying Title VII.
94
 
                                                     
88
 Rich, supra note 33, at 2. 
89
 SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 2. 
90
 Id. at 3; see also Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 15, at 721–23 (describing the 
“seeming matter-of-fact acceptance of instrumental forms of race” and lamenting 
that “the Court has forgotten why race matters, and should matter in certain contexts 
and why it does not and should not in others” separating it from historical context). 
Frymer and Skrentny do acknowledge that this shift might be a pragmatic response 
to the judicial turn away from traditional remedial enforcement of civil rights laws, 
but still question the adequacy of instrumental diversity as a substitute for, or even 
supplement to, the pursuit of purely egalitarian aims for workplace equality. Id. at 
678–79; see also infra Part II.B. 
91
 Rich, supra note 33, at 2. 
92
 See infra Part II.B. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. 
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2. Diversity as Incompatible with Title VII 
 
The second objection is a more nuanced version of the first. 
Specifically, some progressive scholars point to the expressly remedial 
purpose of Title VII to argue that WDE are not only incompatible with 
Title VII in principle, but expressly prohibited by it.
95
 Skrentny 
explains this objection by emphasizing that non-discrimination and 
equal opportunity are the only permissible goals justifying race- or 
gender-motivated conduct under Title VII.
96
 He concludes that the 
absence of egalitarian goals as a motivation for engaging in WDE 
would prove fatal to their defense under Title VII.
97
 
 
The problem with this objection is that it conflates the race- 
and gender-consciousness of WDE with the racial and gender 
preferences of remedial affirmative action; but, as explained above, 
the two are quite distinct.
98
 WDE are race- and gender-conscious in 
                                                     
95
 See White, supra note 82, at 268 (observing that because Title VII has only been 
held to support a remedial interest, the non-remedial diversity interest could not be 
sustained under Title VII); Eric A. Tilles, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter 
on Affirmative Action in Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451, 462 (2004) 
(observing “[u]nder Title VII, an employer may only act to redress past 
discrimination or a manifest imbalance in its workforce….Neither of Grutter’s 
categories of interest…fit within the Title VII analysis,” notwithstanding a prediction 
that Title VII might ultimately be modified to accommodate the diversity interest); 
Ciocchetti & Holcomb, supra note 19, at 347 (arguing that the diversity rationale 
“butt[s] heads with the express language and anti-discriminatory thrust of Title 
VII”); but see Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence 
of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1031, 1048–49 (2004); Green, supra note 78, at 617 (arguing that non-remedial 
justifications in support of racial/gender preferences were not expressly ruled out by 
the Court in Weber); Norton, supra note 19, at 547, 617 (discussing instrumental 
diversity efforts and application to an “employment context.” ). 
96
 SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 80. (“In private employment, where Title VII and 
Section 1981 are the relevant statutes, only classical liberalism and affirmative 
action liberalism have court backing,” noting there is “no [bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ)] defense for race” under either statute.).  
97
 Id. at 88; see also Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate 
Impact Provision and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling 
Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 74, 76–78 (2010) (comparing the instrumental 
justifications for race-consciousness under WDE to prohibited customer preferences 
under the BFOQ defense). 
98
 See supra Part II.A.2. It is important to make a distinction between principle and 
practice as it relates to WDE. See Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the 
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that they acknowledge the instrumental importance of a 
demographically diverse workforce and adopt systematic approaches 
for achieving workplace diversity, but they need not and ought not 
involve racial and gender preferences.
99
 Nor do WDE rely on the 
explicit consideration of race or gender when making individual 
employment decisions.
100
 This distinction is critical for understanding 
why WDE do not necessarily contravene either the purpose or express 
language of Title VII notwithstanding their race- or gender-
consciousness.
101
 Moreover, this distinction is also necessary for 
understanding why Title VII law and doctrine can be, and has 
generally been, amenable to WDE in spite of their instrumental 
aims.
102
 
                                                                                                                             
Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 1592 (discussing the difference 
between WDE in principle and in practice and similarly focusing only on how 
WDE are conceived in principle rather than how they operate in practice). WDE 
do not always operate in practice the way they are conceived in principle. Id. 
Despite this discrepancy, the focus here is on how WDE are conceived in 
principle. Id 
99
 See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, 
supra note 5, at 2476–81 (cautioning that WDE ought not involve explicit 
consideration of race or gender in decision making, but may involve other race- and 
gender-conscious efforts designed to expand opportunities and create a more 
inclusive workplace, such as targeted recruitment or affinity groups). 
100
 Id. at 2476 (discussing the impropriety of expressly considering race or gender 
even as a “tie-breaker” when making employment decisions pursuant to WDE). 
101
 To understand this difference between the inexplicit race and gender-
consciousness of WDE and the explicit racial and gender preferences of affirmative 
action plans, it is instructive to review Justice Kennedy’s equal protection 
jurisprudence on race distinguishing between permissible race-consciousness and 
impermissible racial classifications. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–95 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that classifying students on the basis of race 
must withstand strict scrutiny), with Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. vs. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that race-conscious 
efforts to integrate schools might be permissible if they are race-neutral). For an 
analysis of Kennedy’s jurisprudence on these and similar cases, see Ciocchetti & 
Holcomb, supra note 19, at 342–43. But see Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 
2198 (2016) (suggesting that even race-conscious efforts may be problematic under 
equal protection even when they do not involve racial classifications). 
102
 See infra Part II.B; see generally Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the 
McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra note 5 (surveying decided Title VII diversity 
cases to demonstrate the difference in treatment of WDE that are merely race- and 
gender-consciousness and affirmative action plans involving racial and gender 
preferences). 
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3. Diversity as Exploitive of Women & Racial Minorities 
 
The third objection levied against WDE by progressive 
scholars raises a more practical concern. The complaint is that WDE 
have the potential to operate in ways that are exploitive of women and 
racial minorities who ought instead to be the object of solicitude under 
Title VII.
103
 Nancy Leong explains this objection in an article 
provocatively titled Racial Capitalism.
104
 Leong claims that the 
instrumental value assigned to racial (and gender) identity by 
employers pursuant to WDE results in a commodification of minority 
racial (and female gender) identity by predominantly white (male) 
institutions.
105
 Discussing why WDE are exploitive of (women and) 
racial minorities and should be viewed warily, Leong describes them 
as “merely a useful means . . . to acquire social and economic 
benefits” for predominantly white institutions while “avoiding [the] 
more difficult questions of racial [and gender] equality.” 106 
Exploitation, however, is neither the necessary nor is it an inevitable 
consequence of WDE.
107
 Rather than only generating benefit for the 
employer, WDE often generate tangible benefits for employees as 
well, including specifically women and racial minorities.
108
 These 
                                                     
103
 See Leong, supra note 1, at 2155–56, 2194–96 (discussing how diversity and 
inclusion efforts commodify nonwhite individuals, and examines racial capitalism in 
the workplace); see also Green, supra note 78, at 599 (suggesting that some WDE 
“may generate or exacerbate feelings of exploitation and isolation reported by 
women and people of color”); Wade, supra note 78, at 1545 (noting that work place 
dynamics can lead to situations where “diversity discussions make people of color 
supplicants, and whites become their benefactors”); Rich, supra note 33, at 2, 28, 29 
(describing WDE as “exploitive”); see also Rebecca K. Lee, Core Diversity, 19 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 477, 492 (2009) (describing the ways in which some 
employers implement workplace diversity practices using a “marginal diversity 
approach [that] can leave female and minority workers feeling exploited…[and] 
further contributes to the stereotyping of women and racial minorities”). 
104
 Leong, supra note 1, at 2153. Leong’s claim is broader than WDE. Id. at 2153–
56. She assails diversity efforts generally, but she relies heavily on workplace 
examples to signify her claims. Id. at 2194–96. 
105
 Id. at 2155.  Leong focuses her critique of WDE on their racial harms, but 
acknowledges that these same harms can accrue to other groups targeted by WDE as 
well. Id. at 2184, n. 174 (acknowledging the performative harms that similarly 
accrue to women and LGBT persons); see also id at 2217 (discussing how work 
cultures can impose burdens on the basis of both race and gender). 
106
 Id. 
107
 See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
108
 Id. 
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benefits include, among other things, expanded employment 
opportunities and improved work cultures.
109
 So this critique skews 
the benefit/harm calculus unjustifiably against WDE.
110
 
4. Diversity Essentializes Racial & Gender Identity 
 
A related fourth objection is that WDE tend to essentialize 
and/or entrench gender and racial identities, rather than to disrupt 
stereotypic notions of gender and race and allow for more authentic 
and inclusive expressions of identity to be valued and flourish in the 
workplace.
111
 Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati unpack this claim as it 
relates to race specifically.
112
 Carbado and Gulati acknowledge that all 
employees “feel pressured to signal to their employers that they belong 
and possess the right institutional stuff to succeed.”113 The problem 
with WDE, in their estimation, is that racial minorities and women 
face greater pressures to work their identities in ways that signal their 
belonging to employers than do their white, male peers.
114
 The 
                                                     
109
 Id. 
110
 For an extended discussion of this miscalculation, see Stacy L. Hawkins, Selling 
Diversity Short: An Essay Responding to Nancy Leong’s “Racial Capitalism,” 126 
HARV. L. REV. __ (2013), 40 RUTGERS L. REC. 68 (2013). 
111
 See Norton, supra note 19, at 562 (assailing instrumental rationales relating to 
businesses “race-matching” employees with customers as “a return to long-
discredited ‘customer preference[s]’…[that] indulges the sort of stereotypes that 
antdiscrimination principles seek to counter). For example, Tristin Green discusses 
the distinction between race- and sex-based decisions made pursuant to the diversity 
rationale at moments of entry, promotion, and exit, which she suggests may improve 
overall diversity and equal opportunity for women and racial minorities, and those 
made at the level of organizing work (or in assignment of work), which she suggests 
are “likely to entrench rather than destabilize inequality in organizations” by 
“perpetuat[ing] stereotypes about group difference…lead[ing] to stratification within 
workforces as women and minorities become pigeonholed in certain jobs or job 
functions and those jobs or functions labeled ‘female’ or ‘minority’ are devalued.” 
Green, supra note 78, at 598.  
112
 Accord CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 23. See also Green, supra note 78, 
at 598. 
113
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 23. The concern that WDE essentialize 
gender and racial identity is most likely to arise when diversity is pursued as a means 
of racial signaling, rather than when women and racial minorities are pursued for 
their “racial abilities.” See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
114
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 24–35 (explaining that marginalized 
groups are may feel the need to do more “identity work” to counteract negative 
stereotypes). 
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concern is that when employers assign value to racial and gender 
identity as a part of WDE women and racial minorities are forced to 
perform their identities in ways that might be inauthentic and that can 
be harmful.
115
 
 
However, an important distinction identified by Carbado and 
Gulati, and one that helps distinguish when WDE may be harmful to 
women and racial minorities, and when they may instead actually be 
beneficial, is whether the racial signal the institution sends about its 
value for workplace diversity requires individuals to “act white” or to 
“act [ ] diverse.”116 Carbado and Gulati explain that some institutions 
might value individuals who are “diverse in terms of how they look, 
but not diverse in terms of how they act.”117 Rebecca Lee calls this 
“surface diversity.” 118  Carbado and Gulati also concede that 
institutions might instead value individuals who both look and act 
“diverse”119 or what Lee would call “core diversity.”120 If employers 
value those who both look and act diverse, then applicants and 
employees might feel empowered to be more rather than less authentic 
                                                     
115
 Id. at 42 (describing identity work as “shadow work…unacknowledged as a 
formal matter [and] largely unregulated as a legal matter” with wide reaching 
implications). Carbado and Gulati acknowledge that performance can occur along a 
number of axes, such as dress, speech, and personal or professional affiliation. See 
id. at 1–3. This identify work has many potentially negative implications. See id. at 
42. 
116
 Id. at 21, 116. 
117
 Id. at 125. Carbado and Gulati further elucidate this desire by explaining that an 
institution might very well value diverse individuals for their ability to signal the 
openness of the institution, but believe that persons who look different, but act the 
same as other institutional “insiders” are likely to generate the most benefit at the 
lowest cost to institutional harmony. Id. at 123 (discussing the need for diversity 
agents to be likeable outsiders by expressing ideological commitments and social 
behaviors that conform to institutional norms). Not all progressive scholars believe 
that selecting for intra-racial diversity is harmful to racial minorities, or undesirable 
generally. See Vinay Harpilani, Narrowly Tailored But Broadly Compelling: 
Defending Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 761, 
817–24 (2015) (discussing the value of universities selecting for intra-racial diversity 
as a part of race-conscious admissions).  
118
See Lee, Core Diversity, supra note 103, at 489 (describing an expectation that 
diverse employees act in identical ways by disregarding difference). 
119
 CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 136–38. 
120
 See Lee, Core Diversity, supra note 103, at 494 (describing the “core diversity” 
model as leveraging individual differences to improve organizational practices). 
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when expressing their identity in the workplace.
121
 WDE that allow for 
these more authentic identity performances are not likely to incur the 
kinds of harms that concern progressives.
122
 Rather, this value for 
“core diversity” would seem to further, not hinder, the workplace 
equality goals of Title VII by creating more inclusive work cultures.
123
 
What each of these scholars, including Carbado and Gulati, implicitly 
acknowledge is that WDE are not always bad, nor do they necessarily 
                                                     
121
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 37–38. The reason these demands 
might be ameliorated is because the instrumental concern for leveraging workplace 
diversity to improve business performance (functional diversity) actually relies on 
individual differences associated with persons of different gender, race or ethnicity 
without concern for or attention to the ways in which these differences conform to or 
conflict with perceptions (stereotypical or otherwise) of group identity. See PAGE 
supra note 57, at 305–09; see also Barak, supra note 50, at 87. To the extent that 
these instrumental diversity values ameliorate identity performance demands, they 
are an advantage over the status quo in which racial and ethnic minorities are 
required to do identity performance work as a matter of course. See also Leong, 
supra note 1, at 2204–05 (describing the continuous acknowledgement and 
negotiation of racial identity by nonwhites irrespective of context). For a discussion 
of identity performance demands more generally, see KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: 
THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). 
122
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 23–25 (acknowledging that all 
individuals perform identity work across a range of different contexts). Accordingly, 
the mere fact of performing identity work does not incur harm to women and racial 
minorities. Id. Instead, only particular types of identity work that are least true to an 
individual’s sense of authentic self are the subject of concern. Id. at 35. Nancy Leong 
also distinguishes between qualitatively different types of diversity, referring to its 
“thin” and “thick” conceptions in the same way that Lee distinguishes between 
“surface diversity” and “core diversity.” Leong, supra note 1, at 2169. In diversity 
management terms, this is the difference between diversity and inclusion. See 
generally Barak, supra note 50. 
123
 Carbado and Gulati offer Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination for the Supreme 
Court by President Obama as an example of this potentially beneficial form of 
diversity. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 116–18. They suggest “something 
more was at stake vis-à-vis her nomination than to simply have the Court ‘look’ 
more diverse in its official photographs.” Id. at 117. Without attributing any 
particular motive to the nomination, they consider the possibilities that perhaps it 
was Justice Sotomayor’s ability to “speak explicitly from her experiences as a 
Latina”, or her willingness to “be racially salient when the moment called for it” that 
contributed to her nomination. Id. at 117–18. Either of these motivations are 
manifestations of WDE that would seem to be beneficial both for individuals, by 
alleviating identity performance demands, and for institutions, by both signaling 
openness and promoting cultural competence. See supra note 27 and accompanying 
text (describing instrumental interests). 
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incur the kinds of harms to women and racial minorities for which we 
should seek legal redress.
124
 
 
Accordingly, whether identity performance demands are 
harmful or beneficial to racial minorities and women follows from the 
way in which diversity is valued and practiced by individual 
institutions, not by the adoption of WDE per se.
125
 If individuals are 
valued for their distinctive characteristics, rather than just for their 
membership in a particular group, i.e., “core diversity,” this is likely to 
inure both to the benefit of the institution and to the individual.
126
 
Conversely, when institutions value only “surface diversity,” 
notwithstanding any institutional value that may accrue from these 
efforts, concerns rightly arise about the exploitation of, and harm to, 
women and racial minorities from these practices.
127
  
 
The thrust of both these latter arguments is an objection to the 
way WDE operate in practice, rather than an objection to the 
instrumental justifications underlying WDE in principle.
128
 
Accordingly, these objections suggest we might be able to restrain 
WDE in practice to accommodate this concern for their potential 
harms while also promoting their demonstrated equality-enhancing 
                                                     
124
 Cf. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 148 (acknowledging the difficulties of 
sorting out the legal claims associated with working identity). 
125
 Id. 
126
 See Lee, supra note 118 and accompanying text. The value of promoting 
workplace inclusion may even exceed the EEO goals of Title VII because the 
emphasis is not merely on improving diversity as measured by the numeric 
representation of women and racial minorities in the workplace, but on ensuring the 
qualitative experiences of women and racial minorities are improved by fostering 
higher levels of engagement from these employees. See Nishii, supra note 65, at 
1768; Buttner et al., supra note 65, at 249 (discussing how WDE improve the work 
climate for women and racial minorities and foster greater engagement). 
127
 See Lee, supra note 103, at 490 (noting surface diversity operates to exclude 
rather than include difference). 
128
 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. There is, however, a sense in 
which critics of WDE believe that they are equal-opportunity suppressing in practice 
precisely because they are believed to be anti-egalitarian in principle. See, e.g., 
Green, supra note 78, at 598 (arguing that WDE are likely to entrench inequality 
because they are justified in instrumental rather than egalitarian terms). This 
conclusion does not follow if we understand WDE in the context of their equal 
opportunity origins, see supra Part II.A.3., and acknowledge their equality 
enhancing effects, see supra Part II.B. 
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effects.
129
 Before turning to these prescriptive claims, it is first helpful 
to understand how this general critique of WDE translated into a 
specific doctrinal critique under Title VII in the wake of Grutter. 
B. The Post-Grutter Doctrinal Critique of Workplace Diversity 
 
The body of scholarship produced by progressive employment 
law scholars in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in 
Grutter v. Bollinger also reflected skepticism towards WDE.
130 
 More 
than sixty-five corporate amici argued in Grutter that student body 
diversity was necessary to succeed in the twenty-first century global 
economy, and the Court placed heavy emphasis on this business 
rationale when approving of the interest in student body diversity on 
behalf of colleges and universities.
131
 Not surprisingly then, in the 
wake of that decision, legal scholars rushed to predict the likely impact 
of the Supreme Court’s embrace of this diversity interest in Grutter on 
corporate employers’ ability to justify race- and gender-conscious 
action in employment by asserting a comparable diversity interest 
under Title VII.
132
 Despite the fairly strong endorsement of the 
diversity interest to the workplace in Grutter,
133
 many of these 
scholars seemed to reject the possibility that the Court would fully 
embrace the diversity interest when adjudicating it under prevailing 
                                                     
129
 See infra Part IV.B. 
130
 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; see Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra 
note 58, at 4.  Grutter involved a challenge by a white female applicant denied 
admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Id.  She alleged that the 
School’s race-conscious admissions plan violated the equal protection clause.  Id.  
However, in upholding the School’s race-conscious admissions plan against 
challenge, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the School’s interest in achieving a 
diverse student body was sufficiently compelling to justify the use of race in 
admissions; and moreover that the flexible, holistic review process employed by the 
School was appropriately narrowly tailored as required by the prevailing strict 
scrutiny standard applicable to race-based equal protection challenges. Id. 
131
 Grutter, 539 U.S. 330; see Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 
58, at 10. 
132
 See infra note 138 (discussing these predictions). 
133
 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor emphasized 
that the instrumental benefits of diversity were “not theoretical but real, as major 
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly 
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, culture, ideas, and viewpoints.” Id. 
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Title VII doctrine, which they interpreted as permitting only remedial 
race-consciousness.
134
  
 
Cynthia Estlund’s post-Grutter analysis is illustrative of this 
critique.
135
 Much like Skrentny’s principled objection to WDE, 
Estlund’s doctrinal critique expressed deep concern for the tension 
between the instrumental rationales articulated in support of WDE and 
the remedial, anti-discrimination goals of Title VII.
136
 She expressed 
particular concern that rather than promoting the remedial and 
integrative goals of Title VII, WDE instead were a modern echo of 
employers’ formerly discredited attempts to cite white customer 
preferences as a means of avoiding compliance with the non-
discrimination mandate of Title VII.
137
 However, perhaps recognizing 
the growing embrace of WDE by employers, Estlund suggested that 
rather than simply reject these WDE outright, courts should instead 
require employers to frame their WDE in both instrumental and 
integrative terms to prevent the instrumental aims from overriding the 
integrative goals of Title VII.
138
 To illustrate her prescriptive claim, 
                                                     
134
 Id. See, e.g., Green, supra note 78, at 621; White, supra note 82, at 263–64; Rich, 
supra note 33, at 1–2; Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 215–16; 
Lillard, supra note 18, at 146; but see Tilles, supra note 95, at 463 (although 
acknowledging the discontinuity between the instrumental rationales for diversity in 
Grutter and the remedial goals of Title VII, suggest “some basis to believe the 
conflict will be resolved by modifying the Title VII analysis to conform to 
Grutter.”); Richard N. Appel et al., Affirmative Action in the Workplace: Forty Years 
Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 549 (2005) (suggesting that non-remedial 
diversity rationales may be extended in Title VII context). 
135
 See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19; see also Estlund, Putting 
Grutter to Work, supra note 60. 
136
 See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 217–18. Estlund offered a 
more charitable reading of Grutter and its effects on Title VII in a later article in 
which she suggested that employers might be able to justify their WDE by 
demonstrating that prospective measures of diversity were as suitable as remedial 
measures of racial imbalance in deciding whether to permit voluntary affirmative 
action. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work, supra note 60, at 6. This suggestion that 
employers ought to be permitted to engage in racial or gender preferences as a part 
of WDE is problematic, however, because allowing racial or gender preferences for 
instrumental reasons raises precisely the concerns for exploitation of women and 
racial minorities that Estlund seeks to avoid. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
137
 Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 219. These concerns are 
reflected in the legislative history of Title VII and gave rise to the exclusion of race 
as a “bona fide occupational qualification” under the statute. 
138
 See Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 220. Estlund suggested 
that these limits must accommodate claims for individual rights. Id. For a discussion 
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Estlund cited the Court’s reasoning in Grutter, recognizing the 
instrumental reasons for valuing student body diversity but also 
acknowledging the need for special attention to enrolling 
underrepresented minority students.
139
 By expressly wedding the 
diversity interest to remedial concerns in this way, Estlund argued that 
Grutter “cured the historical amnesia of the conventional 
[instrumental] argument,” and she encouraged the same approach for 
WDE.
140
  
 
Tristin Green similarly argued that courts could not sanction 
WDE without undermining the force and effect of Title VII’s 
solicitude for protecting women and racial minorities from workplace 
discrimination.
141
 Green suggested that because integration and 
equality are not “dominant themes” of the instrumental rationales for 
WDE, these efforts are more likely to “entrench rather than destabilize 
[workplace] inequality.” 142  But Green too attempted to blunt this 
presumptively negative impact by suggesting, similar to Estlund, that 
courts require employers who pursue WDE to also serve the goal of 
“reducing present and future workplace discrimination” thereby 
“further[ing] Title VII’s broader statutory goals” in addition to 
whatever instrumental goals might be furthered by these efforts.
143
 
 
On the whole this body of literature largely predicted very 
limited, if any, application of the instrumental rationales recognized in 
Grutter to private employers defending WDE under Title VII unless 
the result was expressly to further the remedial, anti-discrimination 
goals of Title VII.
144
 This principled opposition to WDE, however, 
                                                                                                                             
of how Title VII might accommodate the concern for individual claims of 
discrimination. See infra Part IV.B. 
139
 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (acknowledging that a “‘critical mass’ of 
underrepresented minorities is necessary to further [the Law School’s] compelling 
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”) 
140
 Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19, at 218, 220. Notably, WDE 
already target underrepresented groups. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
141
 See Green, supra note 78, at 598. 
142
 Id. 
143
 Id. at 620–21. Green concluded that employers should only be permitted to 
pursue race- and gender-conscious goals if they are “intended to reduce workplace 
discrimination.” Id. at 614. 
144
 See supra note 138. These predictions did exhibit nuance, despite their caution. 
For example, Eric Tilles suggested that courts might try to resolve the inherent 
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was tempered by some pragmatism that these efforts might be 
tolerable if there could be some forced alignment with the egalitarian 
objectives of Title VII.
145
 This proposed prescription, like the related 
critique, fails to recognize the existing alignment between WDE and 
the egalitarian objectives of Title VII.
146
 Despite their instrumental 
goals, WDE remain allied with their EEO origins insofar as they 
continue to have equality-enhancing effects by improving equal 
opportunities for women and racial minorities and fostering inclusive 
work cultures.
147
 The challenge for progressives is not to create 
alignment between WDE and workplace equality, or force this 
alignment to be more explicit.
148
 The challenge instead ought to be for 
Title VII law and doctrine to be developed and interpreted in ways that 
                                                                                                                             
conflict between the remedial scheme of Title VII and the instrumental diversity 
interest by “modifying the Title VII analysis to conform to Grutter.” Tilles, supra 
note 95, at 463. Cynthia Estlund, on the other hand, argued that the impact of 
Grutter would be more limited in the employment context, amounting to no more 
than a different means of demonstrating a manifest imbalance in the workforce by 
importing the “critical mass” concept from Grutter into the Title VII proof scheme 
for voluntary affirmative action under Weber and Johnson. See generally Estlund, 
Taking Grutter to Work, supra note 19 (treating Grutter diversity interest favorably 
even while critiquing WDE). Notably, this skepticism and hostility towards WDE 
can be contrasted with progressives’ general approval of the Court’s embrace of 
instrumental diversity in the context of higher education admissions. Id. (citing to 
Grutter approvingly). 
145
 See, e.g., SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 268–69. Skrentny, for instance, goes to 
great lengths to reconcile what he believes is the irreversible trend towards WDE 
with what he believes to be the fundamental goal of Title VII—achieving workplace 
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities. Id. at 268–69. Skrentny dedicates 
an entire chapter of his book to sorting out the possible legal consequences of the 
turn towards WDE, and attempts to reconcile them to the egalitarian purposes 
underlying Title VII. Id. at 265–90. See also Turner, supra note 18, at 233–34 
(suggesting the diversity rationale might be available, if at all, to public employers, 
but suggesting that the instrumentalist goals that accompany the diversity rationale 
necessitate “higher scrutiny” to ensure they do not offend the “fundamental 
antidiscrimination and integrationist” ideals that Title VII embodies.); Green, supra 
note 78 (advocating for acceptance of diversity only if properly aligned with the 
integrative goals of Title VII); Wade, supra note 78 (suggesting that in order for 
diversity to promote the interests of women and minorities it workplace equality, it 
must be coupled with a compliance-oriented perspective that seeks to reduce 
discrimination); Rich, supra note 33 (suggesting that diversity efforts be combined 
with institutional practices designed to support the advancement of underrepresented 
persons as envisioned by Title VII). 
146
 See supra Part II.A.3. 
147
 See supra notes 65–67. 
148
 See infra Part III.B. 
Hawkins 
2016]  LONG ARC OF DIVERSITY 91 
 
 
promote the existing equality-enhancing effects of WDE and limit 
their possibility for engendering the kinds of harms identified by 
progressive scholars.
149
 
 
Notably, pragmatism may have prevailed over principle in 
shaping the doctrinal prescriptions proposed by progressive scholars in 
part because the more favored remedial and integrative approaches to 
Title VII enforcement have become increasingly ineffective in 
preventing and correcting workplace discrimination against women 
and racial minorities, let alone in promoting workplace equality.
150
 
Although progressive scholars have decried this judicial turn away 
from more robust remedial enforcement of Title VII,
151
 it likely 
                                                     
149
 See infra Part III.B. This prescription is not the same as the progressive 
prescription that employers be forced to justify WDE in remedial or integrationist 
terms or to structure these efforts with an eye towards remedial or integrationist 
aims. Rather, the suggestion here is that Title VII law and doctrine be developed in 
ways that acknowledge and approve of WDE insofar as they demonstrate continued 
compatibility with the workplace equality goals of Title VII and otherwise restrict or 
proscribe their operation when their effects serve to undermine the goal of workplace 
equality. For a fuller discussion of this prescription, see infra Part IV.B and cites 
therein. 
150
 See Sullivan, supra note 95, at 1085–87 (recognizing a “retrenchment” by the 
Supreme Court in Title VII cases that reflects a view of discrimination as “rare” 
rather than commonplace and observing “[r]acial discrimination, and to a lesser 
extent sex discrimination, has become so anathematized in our society that it is 
increasingly hard for juries (even judges) to believe it occurs.”); Natasha Martin, 
Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 318 (2010) (discussing the many ways that 
Title VII standards have been ratcheted up to make it more difficult for 
discrimination plaintiffs to succeed); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court 
Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1160, 1163 
(2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s narrowing construction of Title VII has 
limited its ability to accomplish the original goal of securing workplace equality on 
behalf of women and minorities); Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations 
Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. 
SOC. No. 3, 888–954 (2011) [hereinafter Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule] 
(applying sociological neoinsitutional theory to demonstrate that prevailing Title VII 
legal standards do not adequately police institutional actors for discriminatory 
conduct, but simply defer to employers who demonstrate structural compliance with 
EEO laws). 
151
 See Martin, supra note 150, at 318 (discussing how pretext standard has operated 
to foreclose relief for Title VII plaintiffs); Chambers, supra note 150, at 1162 
(discussing how expanded deference to employers has operated to limit remedies for 
Title VII plaintiffs); see also Sullivan, supra note 95, at 1085–87 (observing 
“retrenchment by the Supreme Court in Title VII cases reflects a change in the ‘basic 
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explains why, despite some misgivings, many progressive scholars 
have often not rejected WDE outright but instead have offered 
qualified support for these efforts.
152
  
C. Diversity & Equality: An Unlikely Alliance 
 
This turn away from robust enforcement of traditional civil 
rights remedies is not unique to Title VII, but indicative of a broader 
judicial trend.
153
 The receding tide of civil rights enforcement, while 
lamentable, actually offers progressive scholars the chance to re-
envision equal opportunity law and doctrine by finding unlikely allies 
(employers) and deploying unlikely tools (WDE) in the fight for 
workplace equality.
154
 From this perspective, WDE might be viewed 
as beneficial, rather than detrimental, to the cause of workplace 
equality.
155
 As traditional civil rights remedies have narrowed, WDE 
                                                                                                                             
assumption’ underlying McDonnell Douglas: discrimination…is now viewed as rare 
…courts [are] more likely to believe cronyism…[or] personal animus explains 
disadvantages for minorities. These alternate explanations are increasingly replacing 
a presumption of discrimination in the courts.”). 
152
 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
153
 The most recent evidence of this trend in the employment context is Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (rejecting an employer’s race-conscious efforts to 
avoid a disparate impact in the promotion of firefighters by holding than an 
employer must demonstrate a “strong basis in evidence” that the disparate impact 
will result in legal liability before engaging in a race-conscious remedy to cure the 
disparity). This trend can be seen in other legal domains as well, including 
education. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007) (striking down race-conscious student assignments in primary and 
secondary schools) and voting rights, see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013) (striking down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). 
154
 This opportunity, and the unlikely alliance with corporate employers, has been 
acknowledged by at least some progressive scholars. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 103; 
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150; Wade, supra note 78; see 
also Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra 
note 5 (arguing that WDEs may, ironically, redeem Title VII as a bulwark for the 
protection of women and racial minorities). 
155
 Even the EEOC has acknowledged this potential. See Press Release, EEOC, Race 
and National Origin Discrimination Persist 50 Years After EEOC’s Founding (April 
15, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-15-15.cfm (experts 
recommend focus on diversity and inclusion efforts as a way to reduce workplace 
discrimination and continuing inequalities). 
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have opened up space for alternate practices and accompanying 
doctrines of anti-discrimination law to emerge.
156
 
 
In some ways WDE have created a dilemma for progressive 
scholars who tend to view them as antithetical to the principles they 
believe best effectuate workplace equality, such as the remedial 
principle underlying Title VII.
157
 At the same time, these scholars also 
recognize that narrowing judicial redress for traditional workplace 
discrimination under Title VII leaves much of the inequality 
experienced by women and racial minorities in the modern workplace 
unredressed.
158
 This is a false dilemma.
159
  
 
Progressive scholars need not betray the commitment to 
equality, or even abandon the remedial principles underlying Title VII, 
to embrace WDE and their potential for creating more inclusive and 
equitable workplaces for women and racial minorities.
160
 WDE are 
neither inherently nor inevitably antithetical to the principles of 
equality underlying Title VII.
161
 Rather, they have the potential to be 
equality-enhancing, despite their expressly instrumental aims.
162
 
Notwithstanding the progressive scholarly critiques that followed in 
                                                     
156
 Cf. id. By comparison, the literature exploring these alternate theories of equality 
under equal protection doctrine is wide-ranging; see Reva Siegel, From 
Colorblindness to Anti-Balkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race 
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 1282 (2011) (positing that one way to 
understand the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence is as a mechanism for 
avoiding racial balkanization among groups and simultaneously, facilitating social 
cohesion among groups); see generally William Eskridge, A Pluralist Theory of the 
Equal Protection Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239 (2009) (envisioning the 
protection of minority rights as a function of a pluralist political system of 
governance that safeguards fully participating social minority groups from class 
legislation harmful to their collective interests). See generally Kenji Yoshino, The 
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (suggesting that a liberty-
based theory of substantive due process rights supplant equality-based theories of 
rights on behalf of minority groups). 
157
 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.  
158
 Id.  
159
 See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
160
 See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, 268-269 (discussing the diversity rationale as 
complementary to the traditional, remedial rationales).  
161
 See supra Part II.B. 
162
 Id. 
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the wake of Grutter, WDE deserve renewed and refocused 
consideration to assess their potential for advancing workplace 
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities.
163
 
 
In deciding whether to embrace or reject WDE, progressive 
legal scholars ought to weigh several considerations. First, 
progressives must decide whether, on balance, WDE serve or disserve 
the goal of workplace equality in practice, rather than focusing only on 
how they are justified in principle. In adjudging the efficacy of school 
districts’ efforts to desegregate elementary schools in the wake of 
Brown v. Bd. of Education, the Supreme Court famously remarked that 
the best plan was one that “promises realistically to work, and 
promises realistically to work now.”164 Similarly, WDE should not be 
judged solely by their instrumental rationales, but by whether they 
“promise realistically to work” in advancing workplace equality on 
behalf of those women and racial minorities who continue to suffer 
                                                     
163
 This is not to say that support for WDEs should supplant diligent enforcement of 
Title VII through the prosecution of traditional claims of discrimination on behalf of 
women and racial minorities or voluntary affirmative action by employers, where 
such actions can be justified and defended under prevailing legal standards. See 
Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra n. 5 
at 2465.  Increasingly, however, these efforts are difficult to defend and employers 
should be mindful of the ratcheting up of the legal standards applicable to voluntary 
affirmative action efforts. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (requiring 
that employers demonstrate not only a manifest imbalance in the workplace as a 
predicate for voluntary affirmative action, but also a strong basis in evidence that the 
employer would be subject to liability for disparate impact discrimination). Nor is 
the claim that support for WDE should be uncritical. The suggestion is instead that 
WDE might offer some incremental benefit in achieving the goal of workplace 
equality on behalf of women and racial minorities, beyond that accomplished by 
remedial enforcement of Title VII alone, particularly as these remedial efforts 
decline in scope and significance. This is not the same argument made by Estlund 
and others that courts should sanction WDE only when they are aligned with 
remedial and integrationist goals. See supra notes 65–67. Rather, the claim here is 
that in addition to pursuing remedial enforcement of Title VII through traditional 
discrimination claims prosecuted by and on behalf of women and racial minorities, 
or even the adoption of voluntary affirmative action plans, we ought to consider how 
employer-adopted WDE might complement these Title VII enforcement efforts 
given the collateral benefits that often accrue to women and racial minorities from 
these programs. See supra Part II.A.3. 
164
 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
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from discrimination and exclusion in the workplace.
165
 The evidence 
suggests WDE have the potential to be equality-enhancing not just in 
spite of but perhaps because of their expressly instrumental aims.
166
 
 
Second, consideration must be given to the shifting trajectory 
of anti-discrimination law, and Title VII doctrine in particular.
167
 If 
there are ways to leverage this doctrinal shift, those strategies ought to 
be fully deployed in service of the equality goals underlying Title 
VII.
168
 Derrick Bell’s often-cited interest convergence theory posits 
that equality for underrepresented minority groups may be possible 
only when the interests of these groups are aligned with the interests of 
the majority.
169
 In many ways interest convergence theory explains 
why embracing WDE might offer the best hope for advancing 
workplace equality for women and racial minorities.
170
  
 
III. DIVERSITY & EQUALITY: POSSIBILITIES AND NEW PREDICTIONS 
 
In order to understand how best to leverage Title VII law and 
doctrine to ensure that WDE continue to advance workplace equality 
consistent with their EEO origins, even as they also realize 
instrumental goals, it is necessary to first understand how Title VII law 
has responded to WDE to date. Although the Supreme Court has yet to 
                                                     
165
 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text; see infra note 211 (discussing the 
ways Title VII fails to prevent/correct many forms of discrimination). 
166
 See supra notes 65 and 76 and accompanying text. 
167
 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
168
 The EEOC took a similarly pragmatic approach in its recently released report on 
harassment in the workplace, in which the authors note that while harassment is both 
legally and morally wrong, and ought to be redressed by employers for those reasons 
alone, “employers should also care about stopping harassment because it makes 
good business sense.” CHAI FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, SELECT TASK 
FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 17 (2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf. 
169
 See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and The Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
170
 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 77, at 659 (describing diversity efforts generally as 
“a prototypical example of Bell’s theory of ‘interest convergence’” and even noting 
that Bell himself acknowledged that diversity efforts “fit his interest convergence 
theory.”); see also Lee, supra note 103, at 506 (acknowledging that employers may 
be more motivated to pursue practices that align with their business interests). 
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decide a case involving WDE, many lower federal courts have.
171
 
Overwhelmingly, these courts have approved of WDE when they are 
merely race- and gender-conscious; in contrast they have increasingly 
disapproved of the types of racial and gender preferences, 
characteristic of remedial affirmative action.
172
  
 
Noted legal scholar Lauren Edelman has written extensively 
about how managerial practices, such as WDE, have influenced the 
development of Title VII law and doctrine.
173
 Edelman, writing with 
several colleagues, has identified two theories that explain the 
influence of management’s embrace of WDE on the development of 
Title VII law and doctrine. 
 
A. A Theory of Law & Workplace Diversity 
 
Edelman developed the first theory − “managerialization of 
law” − by studying WDE specifically.174 This theory posits that when 
business managers translate legal rules into business practice, they get 
filtered in a way that reorients them away from an emphasis on legal 
compliance and towards an emphasis on managerial concerns such as 
maximizing productivity and profitability.
175
 This theory describes the 
evolutionary account of WDE precisely, having begun as rebranded 
EEO compliance efforts, then expanded and ultimately transcended 
                                                     
171
 For a quantitative and qualitative analysis of these cases, see generally Hawkins, 
How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, supra note 5, 2467–
73. 
172
 See id. at 2468–69. In a survey of post-Grutter cases, employers defending 
workplaces diversity programs involving race- and gender- conscious efforts that did 
not involve explicit racial or gender preferences experienced an eighty-six percent 
success rate. Id. at 2468. By contrast, employers defending voluntary affirmative 
action plans involving explicit racial and/or gender preferences succeeded only 
fifteen percent of the time. Id. at 2468–69. 
173
 See generally Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra 
note 59; Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150. 
174
 Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 
1597–99. 
175
 Id. at 1599. These motivations are consistent with the instrumental justifications 
offered in support of WDEs. See id. at 1619. Coding references to WDEs that 
appeared in the management literature beginning in the late 1980’s, Edelman et al. 
found that “profit” was the most frequently cited reason in support of WDE, and also 
found references to managerial concerns for demographic diversity, legal 
compliance, fairness and responsiveness to customers. Id.  
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these origins to become the instrumental efforts we see today focused 
largely, if not exclusively, on business performance goals.
176
 What 
Edelman’s theory suggests is that, through the process of “normative 
isomorphism,” this managerial conception of EEO law got conveyed 
back into the legal domain where it has been incorporated into the 
law.
177
 Consequently, EEO law has become “managerialized” or 
“infused” with the managerial value for instrumental diversity as an 
acceptable means of achieving EEO compliance.
178
 Importantly, at the 
same time that law becomes managerialized, businesses also become 
more “legalized” by these new legal norms shaped by and responsive 
to their managerial concerns.
179
 Although Edelman, like many other 
progressive legal scholars, cautions about the dangers of this shift that 
WDE have occasioned away from a more remedial EEO compliance 
orientation, she nevertheless acknowledges the transformative 
potential of WDE for both Title VII law and employment practice, 
particularly in light of the waning remedial enforcement of Title 
VII.
180
  
                                                     
176
 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
177
 Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 
1595–96. The authors explain this process of “normative isomorphism” as consistent 
with “institutional theory,” which “posits that the professions are key carriers of 
ideas among and across organizational fields and that the personnel, managerial, and 
legal professions are particularly important carriers of ideas about law” making them 
a “source of normative isomorphism within and across [each of these] organizational 
fields.” Id. Specifically, they found that the management rhetoric accompanying and 
justifying the adoption of WDE had a particularly strong influence on the 
construction of Title VII law because the management rhetoric emphasizing the 
“novelty” of these practices allowed the logic of instrumental diversity to challenge 
the increasingly contested meaning of EEO law. Id. at 1610–11, 1631 (describing the 
decline in EEO enforcement during the Reagan Administration and the ensuing 
public/political backlash against affirmative action). The result was the development 
of legal standards that gradually embraced instrumental diversity’s expanded 
conception of who ought to be protected against workplace discrimination under 
Title VII, as well as a shift in emphasis away from remediation and towards 
organizational effectiveness. Id. at 1602. 
178
 Id. This can be seen in the Court’s embrace of this managerial value for 
instrumental diversity in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 220, as well as in the EEOC’s embrace 
of WDEs. EEOC, supra note 22, at 150, 162. 
179
 See Edelman et al., Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, supra note 59, at 
1602. 
180
 Id. at 1632. According to Edelman et al., the cost of this shift is that it “divests 
law of its moral component.” Id. The benefit, however, is that because “civil rights 
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Applying this managerialization of law theory to judicial 
decision-making in Title VII cases, Edelman and her colleagues 
identified a related phenomenon at the intersection of law and 
management practice – the “legal endogeneity” of organizations – that 
builds on managerialization of law.
181
 Edelman and her colleagues 
demonstrated that whatever resulting compliance practices employers 
adopt in response to the new managerialized version of EEO law, 
“legal actors and legal institutions become increasingly likely to 
associate those practices with legal compliance.”182  Legal endogenity 
can be broken down into three, progressive stages: reference, 
relevance, and deference.
183
 Reference indicates that “organizational 
structures have entered the judicial lexicon”. 184  Relevance occurs 
when judges consider these managerial practices in the determination 
of legal compliance.
185
 Finally, at the deference stage, judges are more 
likely than not to presume the legal adequacy of these managerial 
practices to accomplish the intended compliance goal without 
scrutinizing their actual effects.
186
  
 
Edelman, et al. tested this theory of legal endogeneity by 
studying judicial review of employers’ discrimination and harassment 
policies and procedures in cases alleging workplace discrimination and 
harassment.
187
 They found that, despite the lack of empirical proof of 
the beneficial effects of these policies and procedures for preventing or 
correcting discrimination and/or harassment as intended (and in some 
                                                                                                                             
law…never provided a panacea for women, minorities and other disenfranchised 
groups, …[diversity] may overcome much of the managerial resistance to 
nontraditional workers by transforming the notion of ‘difference’ from one of legal 
imposition to one of business advantage.” Id. at 1632–33. 
181
 Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at 890. 
182
 Id. Similar to the managerialization of law, Edelman et al. found the context is 
ripened for legal endogeneity when there is ambiguity or political contest 
surrounding the law, as there was concerning EEO enforcement during the rise of 
WDE. Id. at 891. 
183
 Id. at 893–94. 
184
 Id. at 894. 
185
 Id. 
186
 Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at 894. 
187
 Id. at 898–900.The policies and procedures studied by Edelman and her 
colleagues included anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies, as well as the 
attendant training and complaint procedures. Id. 
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cases proof of their harm), the more commonplace these policies and 
procedures became the more likely judges were to cite to them as a 
material consideration in adjudging Title VII liability (i.e., the greater 
their reference and relevance), and also the more likely these policies 
and procedures were to “acquire an aura of legitimacy irrespective of 
their impact,” (i.e., the greater their deference).188 Once presumptively 
legitimate, Edelman and her colleagues found that judges were less 
likely to scrutinize these policies and procedures for their practical 
effect in achieving Title VII compliance, and were instead more likely 
to simply reference their very existence as evidence of an employer’s 
Title VII compliance, or as evidence rebutting an employee’s claim of 
discrimination or harassment.
189
 Again, Edelman, et al. caution that 
legal endogeneity undermines robust Title VII enforcement, but they 
also acknowledge that this effect is not inevitable if legal actors 
closely scrutinize managerial practices for their efficacy in promoting 
the workplace equality goals underlying Title VII.
190
  
 
Based on these findings, it is not surprising that as WDE have 
proliferated, they have become managerialized in law.
191
 More 
important, as they have expanded both their reference
192
 and 
relevance,
193
 they have become increasingly likely to receive judicial 
deference.
194
 This insight is helpful for understanding why, contrary to 
                                                     
188
 Id. at 898–900. 
189
 Id. at 902. 
190
 Id. at 933, 935. 
191
 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
192
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308. Reference to diversity in legal opinions was 
relatively limited prior to its proliferation in corporate America and its judicial 
embrace in Grutter. See id. 
193
 Id. at 330. The judicial embrace of the diversity interest in Grutter, as well as the 
Court’s citation in Grutter to the corporate amicus briefs in support of the claimed 
benefits of diversity as “not theoretical, but real,” demonstrate the increasing 
relevance of these diversity efforts. Id. 
194
 See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, 
supra note 5, at 2477 (discussing cases adjudicating WDE in which courts have 
taken judicial notice of the beneficial value of diversity and its relevance to the 
modern workplace as well as presumed that an employer’s commitment to diversity 
could not be proof of discriminatory intent); see, e.g., Brown v. Delaware River Port 
Auth., 10 F. Supp. 3d 556, 566 (D. N.J. 2014) (rejecting a memorandum instructing 
a hiring manager to change a position description after the initial posting failed to 
yield a diverse applicant pool as evidence of pretext for discrimination, reasoning “if 
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the post-Grutter predictions of many progressive scholars, courts have 
already demonstrated a willingness to embrace WDE as consonant 
with rather than antagonistic to Title VII.
195
  
 
This presumption of legitimacy accorded to WDE by judges is not 
problematic per se.  Yet Edelman, et al. caution courts and other legal 
actors against abdicating their responsibility to ensure adequate 
enforcement of Title VII in the face of these increasing managerial 
pressures.
196
  The theories of managerialization of law and legal 
endogeneity reveal the potential for Title VII law and doctrine to 
police the boundaries between those WDE that are equality-enhancing 
and those that are, or have the potential to be, equality-suppressing.
197
 
By permitting the former and proscribing or otherwise signaling 
disapproval of the latter, Title VII law can help maximize the equality-
enhancing potential of WDE while minimizing their potential harm.
198
   
Notably, the managerialization of WDE into EEO law demonstrates 
that attempts to reject WDE in principle are unlikely to succeed.
199
  
Instead, progressive ought to focus on how best to structure Title VII 
law and doctrine to prevent WDE from realizing any potential harms 
to the greatest extent possible.
200
 
                                                                                                                             
it is literally true then it proves the opposite of discriminatory intent since the stated 
reason for the change was to increase diversity in the applicant pool…”); Bissett v. 
Beau Rivage Resorts, 442 F. App’x 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that a diversity 
policy did not support an inference of discrimination where the policy stated that the 
employer “values diversity and considers it an important and necessary tool that will 
enable [the employer] to maintain a competitive edge,” and that the employer “is 
committed to maintaining a workforce that reflects the diversity of the community”). 
195
 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
196
 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
197
 See infra Parts III.A.1–2. 
198
 Title VII has not only enforcement value, but also expressive value. Cf. Katie R. 
Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 527, 569 (2014) (discussing the expressive value of civil rights laws 
targeting anti-gay discrimination). As EEO compliance enforcement legalizes 
employers, they should internalize both the enforcement and expressive values 
embodied in these legal rules. For an example of how employers have already 
internalized EEO compliance in the area of sexual harassment enforcement, see infra 
note 280. 
199 See supra n. 194 (discussing cases in which courts have taken judicial notice of 
the beneficial value of WDE). 
200
 Several other progressive scholars have similarly urged the adoption of 
appropriate limits under Title VII to cabin the harmful effects that can accrue to 
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B. Leveraging Diversity to Advance Workplace Equality 
 
The first equality-suppressing concern reflected in the 
literature critiquing WDE is that these efforts can sometimes operate 
to exploit women and racial minorities.
201
 The second concern is that 
“surface” WDE might have the effect of essentializing racial and 
gender identity and therefore reinforcing instead of disrupting harmful 
stereotypes.
202
 There are two interventions in Title VII law and 
doctrine that would allow courts to better scrutinize WDE for the 
harms that may accrue to women and racial/ethnic minorities when 
WDE go awry in practice.
203
 The first intervention is directed towards 
the harm of essentializing racial and gender identity, and the second is 
directed toward the harm of exploitation.
204
  
1. Disparate Impact Liability for “Surface Diversity” 
 
When employers value women and racial minorities for the 
signal they send to internal or external audiences about the 
organizational commitment to diversity, the employer may essentialize 
race and gender in ways that can be harmful to these employees.
205
 
Notably, these harms are most likely to occur if the employer 
expresses a value only for “surface diversity,” rather than a value for 
“core diversity.” 206  For instance, where employers value “surface 
diversity” employees may feel compelled (or worse yet be obligated) 
to perform “identity work” for the benefit of their employer and to 
                                                                                                                             
women and racial minorities from WDE. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 33, at 47; Wade, 
supra note 78, at 1575. Whereas these scholars largely focus on redirecting the 
underlying rationale of WDE towards remediation and integration, and away from 
instrumental business concerns, the prescriptions offered here focus instead on 
policing the effects of WDE regardless of their underlying rationale. Additionally, 
some of these scholars have suggested that racial and gender preferences might be 
permissible in the interest of instrumental diversity. See supra notes 65–67. For the 
reasons discussed, see infra Part IV.B.2., the prescriptions offered here would 
proscribe the use of racial and gender preferences as a part of WDE. 
201
 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
202
 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
203
 See infra Part III.A.1–2. 
204
 Id. 
205
 See SKRENTNY supra note 2, at 11, for an in-depth discussion of racial signaling. 
206
 See supra notes 120 and 122 and accompanying text (describing “surface” and 
“core” diversity). 
Hawkins  
102   U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 16:2 
 
their own detriment.
207
 The harms that can accrue to women and racial 
minorities from these identity performance demands are largely 
expressive and dignitary, but they can also be more tangible and in 
some instances may even be pecuniary.
208
 The question is how to 
interpret Title VII law and develop Title VII doctrine in these cases to 
promote WDE when they are beneficial (or at least not harmful) to 
women and racial minorities, i.e., core diversity, and to proscribe (or 
otherwise discourage) those WDE that are harmful regardless of any 
instrumental benefit that might accrue to the employer, i.e., surface 
diversity?
209
 
 
Scholars have observed that even when WDE incur harm by 
imposing identity performance demands on women and racial 
minorities, individually these harms may be difficult to remedy under 
Title VII’s prevailing McDonnell Douglas standard applicable to 
                                                     
207
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 24. Common forms of this “identity 
work” include but are not necessarily limited to: appearing in marketing materials, 
attending diversity events, and race- and gender- matched mentoring. See Leong, 
supra note 1, at 2153 (describing a particularly egregious incident where a person of 
color was photo-shopped into a marketing brochure). Carbado and Gulati define this 
identity work more expansively as anything that a woman and/or racial minority 
employee might feel compelled to do to either negate perceptions (often 
stereotypical) of her as an outsider or to promote perceptions of her as an insider. See 
CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 24. 
208
 Title VII’s requirement that plaintiffs prove a tangible adverse employment action 
forecloses the possibility of redress for harms that are only dignitary or expressive in 
nature. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing plaintiff’s burden of proof at the prima facie case 
stage of the analysis to demonstrate some tangible, adverse employment action 
suffered because of that person’s race, ethnicity, gender, or another protected basis). 
Carbado and Gulati quantify the pecuniary harms that can accrue to women and 
racial minorities from working their identities for the benefit of their employer to 
include both lost or diminished career opportunities and lost or reduced 
compensation. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3. For a discussion of the 
burdens placed on racial minorities from both voluntary and involuntary mentoring, 
see Audrey Williams June, The Invisible Labor of Minority Professors, THE CHRON. 
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 8, 2015).  
209
 See infra notes 210–220 and accompanying text. There are two ways that Title 
VII law and doctrine can prevent employers from adopting harmful WDE: First, the 
expressive value of Title VII signals opprobrium of this conduct, thus discouraging it 
in the first instance; and Second, as Edelman and her colleagues demonstrated, legal 
endogeneity operates by influencing the widespread adoption of certain management 
structures rather than others. See supra notes 196 and 190 and accompanying text. 
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claims of disparate treatment discrimination.
210
 Problems of proof 
might arise at various stages of the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework,
211
 including when the plaintiff is called upon to 
offer evidence at the prima facie case stage that an adverse action is 
suffered or that such action is based on the plaintiff’s race or 
gender.
212
 Similarly, at the final stage of proof it may be difficult to 
convince a trier-of-fact that unlawful discrimination, rather than other 
concerns, motivated the employer’s actions. 213  These challenges 
would not be easy to overcome.
214
 However, women and racial 
minorities forced to perform this kind of “identity work” to their 
                                                     
210
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 66 (acknowledging that the harms of 
WDE generally may not be “a problem anti-discrimination law can fix.”). Scholars 
have offered other, novel ways to compensate for these burdens, such as by adjusting 
salary accordingly, reducing other work obligations proportionately, see June, supra 
note 208, or providing additional value to women and racial minorities in exchange 
for this work. See Eli Wald, BigLaw Identity Capital: Pink & Blue, Black & White, 
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2509, 2514 (2015). 
211
 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework requires the plaintiff to first 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by offering proof that: (1) he/she is in a 
protected class, (2) he/she was qualified for the position sought (in the case of hire or 
promotion) or met the employer’s legitimate expectations (in the case of 
termination), and (3) similarly situated employees were treated differently or the 
adverse action was taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802. Assuming the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. This is a burden of production, 
not one of proof. See id. If the defendant satisfies the burden of production at the 
second stage, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who at the third stage must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated by the 
defendant is pretextual and/or that the real reason for the adverse action was 
unlawful discrimination. Id. at 804–05. 
212
 See supra note 211 (detailing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 
generally and the prima facie case burden specifically). 
213
 For instance, Carbado and Gulati concede that identity performance is a routine 
fact of life, and often individuals choose to perform their identities in certain ways 
without any explicit institutional prompting. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 
15. The absence of any act on the part of the employer to demand identity 
performance, or to demand specific types of identity performance, by racial 
minorities or women might prove fatal to a Title VII plaintiff’s burden under the 
McDonnell Douglas proof scheme. See supra note 211 and accompanying text 
(discussing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework). 
214
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that the problems of 
diversity are not about “animus” and therefore are unlikely to be subject to legal 
sanction under existing standards). 
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detriment may not be without remedy if they are able to effectively 
assert a claim for relief under a disparate impact theory of liability.
215
 
Rather than proving individual harm and intentional discrimination 
pursuant to a disparate treatment theory of liability under the 
McDonnell Douglas standard, under a disparate impact theory of 
liability, aggrieved employees need only establish that: (1) the 
employer’s WDE incur the burdens of identity performance; (2) these 
burdens are born disparately by women and/or racial minorities;
216
 and 
(3) such efforts are not “job related” and “consistent with business 
necessity.”217 Pursuing a disparate impact theory of liability might be 
preferable for two reasons.
218
 First, it avoids the problems of proof 
associated with a disparate treatment theory of liability.
219
 Second, and 
perhaps more important, it allows courts to make individualized 
decisions about the effects of WDE in the context of particular 
institutional practices, rather than suggesting that WDE are 
presumptively discriminatory.
220
 An example loosely extrapolated 
from the literature is instructive.  
                                                     
215
 In addition to proscribing individual acts of discrimination, under certain 
circumstances, Title VII also prohibits employers from engaging in any conduct that 
has an adverse impact on a protected class. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
216
 Carbado and Gulati assert as a relatively indisputable proposition that Black 
employees, for example, could establish that they perform more identity work than 
others due to the negative stereotypes attributed to them in the workplace, such as 
laziness and the lack of qualifications, and the need to negate these stereotypes in 
order to enjoy professional success and/or career advancement. See CARBADO & 
GULIATI, supra note 3, at 35–36. If this assumption is true, minority plaintiffs are 
likely to be able to meet the burden of proof on a disparate impact claim; see also 
Leong, supra note 1, at 2207–08 (offering the kind of evidence that might be 
available to demonstrate the disparate burdens placed on racial minority employees 
to work their identity in contexts where their employer instrumentally values 
workplace diversity); see also id. at 2202 (positing that historic racial inequities 
necessarily render a disparate impact in the identity performance demands imposed 
on racial and ethnic minorities versus white employees and suggests this is a matter 
about which anti-discrimination law should be concerned and which it “plausibly 
proscribe[s]”). 
217
 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
218
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 74–76 (discussing these claims under a 
disparate treatment theory of discrimination). 
219
 Id. at 65 (observing proof problems under a disparate impact theory). 
220
 Disparate impact liability tends to have less of a chilling effect on employment 
practices than does disparate treatment liability. Compare, for example, the 
difference between the chilling effect that Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267 (1986), had in proscribing diversity considerations in teacher layoffs and the 
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Imagine that an elite corporate law firm is hiring entry-level 
associates from among a diverse pool of applicants.
221
 This firm has 
expressed a commitment to the instrumental benefits of diversity and 
has avowed to increase their hiring of diverse entry-level associates.
222
 
The hiring committee decides that in addition to evaluating the 
candidates’ academic credentials, the firm will also consider the extent 
to which each candidate would be a good “fit”223 and/or contribute to 
the firm’s diversity.224 Assume that on the basis of the information 
available to the hiring committee from the resumes and interviews of 
the candidates, the selection decisions are as follows: [see table on 
following page]. 
 
                                                                                                                             
negligible effect on pre-employment testing generally of the finding of 
discriminatory impact in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
221
 This example manipulates the hypothetical offered in the original text to highlight 
the potential Title VII claims relating to identity performance. CARBADO & GULATI, 
supra note 3, at 72–76. Carbado and Gulati actually offer two different 
hypotheticals, one involving the non-selection of a Black woman among a group of 
racially and gender-diverse candidates and another involving the non-selection of a 
single Black woman among a group of Black women. Id. 
222
 See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, 
supra note 5 (discussing law firms’ avowed commitment to diversity, including 
specifically hiring diverse associates). 
223
 “Fit” is the subject of much scholarly debate insofar as it may serve as a barrier to 
employment and/or advancement for women and minorities or even as a proxy for 
discrimination. See, e.g., CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 137–39. 
224
 Id. If the candidates were not equally well-qualified based on their credentials, it 
might be more difficult to justify the consideration of diversity in selecting among 
these applicants. See Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas 
Standard, supra note 5 (discussing the legal risks associated with various law firm 
diversity efforts and in particular noting the low risk of liability under the 
McDonnell Douglas standard associated with subjective diversity hiring when 
candidates have equivalent credentials). According to Carbado and Gulati these are 
the precise circumstances in which institutions make intra-racial and intra-gender 
decisions that implicate individual’s working identity and that are likely to impose 
identity performance demands on individuals. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3.  
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Name
225
 Demographic Resume 
Information
226
 
Interviewer’s 
Notes
227
  
Selected 
for Hire 
Elizabeth 
Peters 
White Female Women’s Law 
Caucus (law school) 
Personable, 
team-player, 
ambitious 
Yes 
Rebecca 
Simon 
White Female President’s Diversity 
Cabinet 
(undergraduate) 
Third-generation 
lawyer 
Yes 
William 
Reynolds 
White Male SBA President (law 
school) 
First-generation 
lawyer 
Yes 
Lydia 
Cruz 
Hispanic 
Female 
Young Republicans 
(undergraduate) 
Part-time student 
(law school) 
“Well-spoken” 
 
Yes 
Martin 
Chandler 
Black Male Student Body 
President 
(undergraduate) 
Phi Gamma Delta 
Fraternity
228
 
(undergraduate) 
“well-groomed” Yes 
Tyisha 
Davis 
Black Female Black Student Union 
President 
(undergraduate) 
Black Lives Matter 
organizer (law 
school) 
“Dreadlocks?” No 
Nho Trong 
Nguyen 
Asian Male Asian Pacific 
American Law 
Students Association 
(law school) 
“Heavy accent - 
difficult to 
understand” 
 
No 
                                                     
225
 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily & Greg More 
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 1008–09 (2004) (demonstrating 
employment bias based on applicant names).  
226
 Background information gleaned from resumes can form the basis of mental 
impressions about a candidate’s diversity that lends itself to both inter- and intra-
racial distinctions. See id. at 1007 (discussing a study of resumes that demonstrated 
employment discrimination based on names). 
227
 Numerous cues from an in-person interview can be used to create mental 
impressions about a candidate’s diversity that lends itself to discriminatory attitudes. 
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3 (discussing the way that individuals “whiten” 
their names to conform to an institutional value for whiteness). 
228
 This is not one of the five historically black fraternities. See 
http://www.blackgreek.com/divinenine/.  Its founders were all white, and its 
membership appears to remain predominantly white. See PHIGAM.ORG, 
http://www.phigam.org/2016/about/history (last visited Dec. 29, 2016).  
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In this hypothetical, both the Black female and the Asian male 
not selected would have difficulty establishing a claim for disparate 
treatment discrimination on the basis of their race or national origin 
under the McDonnell Douglas standard.
229
 In the first instance, they 
would have difficulty demonstrating a prima facie case of 
discrimination where the persons selected included both Black and 
other ethnic minority candidates, rebutting any presumption that their 
non-selection was due to race or national origin.
230
 Additionally, these 
individuals would face an equally difficult burden at the third stage of 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to establish that 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of their race, ethnicity or national 
origin was the reason for their non-selection, rather than their name, 
appearance, accent, or other presumptively lawful considerations.
231
  
 
                                                     
229
 See supra note 211. 
230
 Id. (outlining the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the proof 
required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the failure to hire 
context). 
231
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 143. Names, appearance, or accents 
may reasonably be considered performative aspects of race or national origin, but 
they are distinguishable from the phenotypical aspects of race or national origin that 
are generally subject to protection under Title VII. See id. (discussing the court’s 
rejection of accent and appearance discrimination as actionable race or national 
origin discrimination under Title VII). For a general discussion of the ways in which 
Title VII fails to offer protection against discrimination based on these performative 
aspects of race, see Camille G. Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: 
Discrimination By Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004) 
(critiquing courts’ failure to recognize performative aspects of race, such as 
appearance or accent/language, as subject to protection under Title VII); D. Wendy 
Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in the Workplace: Hijabs 
and Natural Hair, 8 FLA. INT’L L. REV. 331 (2013) (arguing for legal recognition 
under Title VII of the discrimination suffered by Black and Muslim women from 
workplace dress codes that regulate appearance); see also Janet Ainsworth, 
Language, Power and Identity in the Workplace, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 233 (2010) 
(arguing that Title VII inadequately protects racial minorities from workplace 
discrimination based on facile distinctions between voluntary and involuntary 
aspects of identity). For a discussion of Carbado and Gulati’s estimation of how 
these claims might fair under Title VII, see generally CARBADO & GULATI, supra 
note 3, 142–44 (discussing the possibility of asserting a “race-plus” claim of 
discrimination, but concluding such a claim is “normatively and theoretically 
problematic”). 
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However, if these candidates’ names, appearance, or accents made 
them less desirable to the employer, this would seem to raise a concern 
that the employer values only “surface diversity,” a practice that Title 
VII ought to proscribe, or at least condemn.
232
 The outlook might be 
different if, rather than trying to remedy individual instances of harm 
arising from these identity performance demands under a disparate 
treatment theory of liability,
233
 we target employers who adopt only a 
“surface diversity” commitment using a disparate impact theory of 
liability.
234
  
 
Under a disparate impact theory of liability, WDE that reflect 
only a commitment to surface diversity ought to be actionable.
235
 A 
disparate impact theory of liability would allow the treatment of 
working identity to be considered actionable discrimination because 
aggrieved employees need not demonstrate that the employer’s 
consideration of working identity amounted to intentional 
discrimination.
236
 Nor do they need to establish that the dispositive 
aspects of working identity are themselves subject to protection under 
                                                     
232
 See Lee, supra note 103, at 490. 
233
 Disparate treatment liability is difficult to establish for any Title VII plaintiff, not 
just those challenging WDE. See generally Martin, supra note 150 (discussing Title 
VII’s failure to address “disparate treatment”). 
234
 See Lee, supra note 103, at 490. Notably, in a search of federal cases adjudicating 
WDE, see Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard, 
supra note 5, at 2467, the only case identified challenging WDE under a disparate 
impact theory of liability was brought by a group of Black employees alleging that 
the employers’ effort to ensure proportionate representation at all levels of the 
company under a balanced workforce plan had a disparate impact on Black 
employees who, under the plan, were considered “overrepresented” in some job 
categories. Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 135 (5th Cir. 2003). In reversing 
summary judgment for the employer, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to a trial on the question of whether the employer’s diversity initiative had a 
disparate impact on the Black plaintiffs. Id. While this case does not demonstrate the 
viability of a disparate impact theory of liability specifically for disapproving of 
“surface diversity,” it does suggest the viability of a disparate impact theory of 
liability generally to redress the harms arising from WDE. See id. 
235
 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (establishing the 
standard for proof of disparate impact liability under Title VII). 
236
 See id. at 432. Under a disparate impact theory of liability, the plaintiff need not 
demonstrate that the discrimination was intentional, but may establish liability by 
offering proof that a neutral policy was administered or enforced in a manner that 
caused women and/or minorities to be adversely and disproportionately affected. Id.  
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Title VII.
237
 Rather, potential plaintiffs would only need to 
demonstrate that the employer’s practice of valuing “surface 
diversity,” caused an adverse impact on women and racial 
minorities.
238
 This proof of adverse impact would then shift the burden 
to the employer to demonstrate that the policy is both job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.
239
 Even if some instrumental 
justification for WDE would suffice to establish their job-relatedness, 
it is unlikely that most employers could demonstrate that the particular 
practice of valuing only “surface diversity” is necessary to achieve the 
instrumental benefits of workplace diversity.
240
 To the contrary, if 
diversity is valued instrumentally for its ability to signal the openness 
of the workplace, or to realize functional or market benefits on behalf 
of the employer,
241
 it necessarily requires employers to embrace not 
just those who look different and act the same, but those who are truly 
different.
242
 In other words, it requires employers to embrace “core 
diversity.” 243  Importantly, unlike pursuing a disparate treatment 
theory, where liability might signal normative disapproval of WDE by 
declaring them presumptively discriminatory,
244
 a disparate impact 
                                                     
237
 See id. at 436 (“Nothing in the act precludes testing or measuring procedures; 
they are obviously useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and 
mechanisms controlling force unless they are a demonstrably reasonable measure of 
job performance.”). 
238
Id. at 431. Adverse impact is often demonstrated through statistical proof. See id. 
Plaintiffs are presumptively able to meet their burden of proving adverse impact if 
they are able to demonstrate that the rate of selection among the protected group is 
less than four-fifths the rate of selection among the non-protected group. See id. In 
the present example, the data set is so small that it might not lend itself to reliable 
statistical proof of adverse impact. However, it is clear from the data that the rate of 
selection among minority applicants (50%) as compared to the rate of selection 
among non-minority applicants (100%) demonstrates the required adverse impact 
where the rate of minority selection is less than four-fifths the rate of non-minority 
selection. 
239
 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
240
 See infra notes 241–245 and accompanying text. 
241
 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the various instrumental 
benefits of WDE). 
242
 See Lee, supra note 103, at 513 
243
 Id.; see also CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3. 
244
 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. This chilling effect would be 
undesirable because of the potential for WDE, when properly administered, to 
improve employment opportunities for and inclusion of women and racial minorities 
in the workplace. See supra Part II.B. Legal sanction under these circumstances 
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theory of liability simply cautions employers to take care not to pursue 
WDE in ways that unduly harm the interests of women and racial 
minorities.
245
 
2. NO Racial & Gender Diversity Preferences 
 
The second concern raised by progressive scholars is that 
WDE may limit opportunities for women and racial minorities by 
exploiting gender or racial identity for the benefit of the employer, and 
to the detriment of employees.
246
 It is worth noting that the 
opportunities that may be opened up for women and racial minorities 
in the workplace as a result of WDE are not insignificant and may 
very well enhance equal opportunities for some, even as they may 
have the potential to limit opportunities for others.
247
 However, even if 
these efforts might be equally likely to expand opportunities, Title VII 
ought to effectively police those WDE that are equality-suppressing.
248
  
 
                                                                                                                             
would send a strong signal to employers about the impropriety of these efforts, even 
if well-intentioned. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
law influences management practice and vice versa through the process of normative 
isomorphism). 
245
 See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text. Ultimately, because it is really 
errant WDE that cause harm, not instrumental diversity in principle, many 
progressive scholars have tried to offer prescriptions directed to the narrower project 
of restraining WDE rather than the broader project of proscribing them. See, e.g., 
Lee, supra note 103, at 513 (advocating that businesses adopt “core diversity” rather 
than “surface diversity” in WDE); Rich, supra note 33, at 47 (conceding that it is 
“ineffective diversity management” rather than WDE per se that warrant objection); 
Wade, supra note 78, at 1575 (suggesting courts impose a duty of care on employers 
adopting WDE); Green, supra note 73, at 613 (suggesting Title VII “harness the 
business interests” in diversity to advance antidiscrimination goals). Many of these 
prescriptions, however, erroneously assume that the justifications for WDE have to 
be modified, rather than simply restricting how they may operate in practice. 
246
 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
247
 See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 39 (acknowledging that WDE might both expand 
and limit employment opportunities for women and racial minorities). 
248
 For example, Skrentny notes that “[i]n occupations as diverse as 
advertising/marketing, medicine, teaching, journalism, and policing, employers see 
value in matching the race of the employee to the race of the clients or citizens he or 
she serves.” Id. at 11. However, as observed by a number of progressive scholars in 
their critiques of WDE, an employer would not likely be able to justify the explicit 
consideration of race in hiring and assignments under prevailing Title VII standards, 
which do not recognize any “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) for race. 
See supra note 96. See generally Green, supra note 78. 
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In particular, the concern from progressive scholars is that 
women or racial minorities, if seen as uniquely qualified to perform 
certain jobs by virtue of their gender or race, may be funneled into 
career-limiting jobs that are segregated by gender and/or race.
249
 
Unlike the harms that arise from “racial signaling”, 250  WDE that 
attempt to leverage “racial abilities” 251  seem highly amenable to 
challenge under a disparate treatment theory, as well as amenable to 
proof under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
252
 In 
contrast to the largely expressive or dignitary harms that may be 
suffered by women and racial minorities from racial signaling, WDE 
that attempt to leverage racial abilities and that result in the exclusion 
of women and/or racial minorities from career-enhancing 
opportunities or conversely that restrict them to career-limiting 
opportunities, are highly amenable to the kinds of proof necessary to 
establish an adverse employment action under the first prong of 
McDonnell Douglas, as well as to proof of unlawful race- and gender-
based discrimination under the third prong of McDonnell Douglas.
253
  
 
Again, an example from the literature is instructive. Skrentny, 
in his book After Civil Rights: Racial Realism in the New American 
Workplace, offers Walgreens as a cautionary tale of the harms that can 
arise from WDE that go awry when attempting to leverage “racial 
abilities.”254 Walgreens had a practice of matching Black managers 
with stores in Black communities.
255
 This was not an attempt to 
invidiously discriminate against Black managers.
256
 Rather, like many 
other businesses that recognize the instrumental value of workplace 
diversity, Walgreens believed that it could better respond to its 
                                                     
249
 See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 39. There is also a concern that this type of job 
assignment stereotypes employees. See also id. at 12–13 (describing the stereotypes 
on which racially segregated jobs are based). See also Green, supra note 78, at 599. 
However, this expressive harm is not amenable to redress under Title VII. But see 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424. 
250
 See SKRENTNY supra note 2, at 11. 
251
 Id. 
252
 See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
253
 Id. 
254
 See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 87. 
255
 Id. 
256
 Id. (noting that the company’s record of hiring and promoting Black managers 
was well above the industry average). 
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customers if its store managers reflected the diversity of the 
communities they served.
257
 Even when well-intentioned, however, 
WDE raise the possibility that the particular practices adopted by 
individual employers may result in suppressing rather than enhancing 
opportunities for women and racial/ethnic minorities or reinforcing 
rather than disrupting harmful racial and gender stereotypes in the 
workplace.
258
 As progressive scholars have noted, this is a serious 
concern.
259
 
 
In this instance, problems arose because Walgreens promoted 
and compensated managers on the basis of store performance, which 
on average was lower in Black communities than in other 
neighborhoods.
260
 The effect was to limit both the compensation and 
promotional opportunities of the Black managers assigned to these 
Black stores. The EEOC sued Walgreens on behalf of these Black 
managers alleging that the practice of assigning store managers based 
on race amounted to unlawful race discrimination.
261
 Walgreens 
settled the EEOC suit for $24 million.
262
 This case demonstrates that 
when WDE go awry in practice, even when well-intentioned in 
principle, there is redress available under Title VII.
263
 It is not difficult 
                                                     
257
 Id. In fact, Walgreens alleged that it made these race-based assignments because 
community groups had themselves requested that Black managers supervise these 
stores. Id. As some progressive scholars have observed, this makes these practices 
reminiscent of the “long-discredited customer preferences” that resulted in the 
exclusion of race as a BFOQ under Title VII. See Norton, supra note 19, at 562. 
258
 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 3, at 42. 
259
 See id.; see generally Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell 
Douglas Standard, supra note 5 (discussing the risk of liability under Title VII of 
various workplace diversity practices, including race- and gender-based selection). 
260
 See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 87. These practices were even more 
objectionable because Walgreens also assigned Black managers to these stores even 
when they objected to these assignments. Id. One Black manager, for instance, 
complained that although he lived in an affluent, predominantly white neighborhood, 
he was assigned to manage a store in a poor Black neighborhood. Id. 
261
 Id. at 88. 
262
 Id. See generally Levit, supra note 56 (discussing the considerations that 
influence employers to settle class action discrimination suits, including public 
pressures). 
263
 See SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 88. 
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to understand why these employees would likely have prevailed under 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
264
  
 
Although the involuntary assignments themselves are not 
likely to be actionable as an adverse employment action under Title 
VII,
265
 the negative implications of these assignments for managers’ 
pay and promotion opportunities certainly would satisfy the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case standard.
266
 Similarly, the fact 
that these assignments were explicitly race-based, even if not 
motivated by intentional discrimination or racial animus, would 
suffice to satisfy the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.
267
 On 
these facts, Walgreens may not even satisfy its burden at the second 
stage of the McDonnell Douglas test to proffer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the assignments.
268
 Instead, the explicit use 
of race to assign managers to stores would likely require Walgreens to 
demonstrate a remedial predicate for its actions as required under the 
Weber/Johnson cases.
269
 Because Walgreens’ purpose in making these 
explicitly race-based assignments was instrumental (i.e., to better 
serve customers), rather than remedial (i.e., to cure a manifest 
imbalance in its workforce), it would likely be unable to defend these 
assignments under the prevailing Weber/Johnson standard.
270
 And that 
is as it should be.
271
 Employing explicit racial and gender preferences 
                                                     
264
 See Lomack v. Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that fire 
department that involuntarily transferred firefighters or otherwise denied transfer 
requests based on race without proof of a remedial interest engaged in impermissible 
racial discrimination). 
265
 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
266
 Id. 
267
 Id. 
268
 Id. 
269
 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; see also Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641–42. 
270
 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. The Court in Weber required a remedial predicate to 
justify racial preferences. Id. But cf. Green, supra note 73, at 617 (noting that Weber 
did not foreclose non-remedial goals as a basis for justifying racial preferences under 
Title VII). 
271
 See Norton, supra note 19, at 563. On this point, Norton is correct in suggesting 
that racial equality requires employers to screen directly for the skills they seek 
rather than to use race as a proxy for these skills. Id. This includes skills that further 
an employer’s instrumental diversity interest, including cultural competence or 
diversity of experience. Id. After all, the empirical research supporting the functional 
benefits of workplace diversity clearly demonstrate that it is not race or gender per 
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make WDE more likely to incur the kinds of harms that most concern 
progressives.
272
 
 
Perhaps Walgreen’s seems to be a particularly egregious case. 
Perhaps there might be concern that other cases will present a more 
challenging set of facts and more difficult prospects for redress of the 
legitimate harm women and racial minorities might suffer from WDE 
gone awry. A look at the trends from decided diversity cases suggests 
such a concern is unwarranted.
273
 Those cases involving minority and 
female plaintiffs challenging WDE under the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework have generally been more successful than 
those by white or male plaintiffs challenging these same efforts.
274
   In 
particular where employers use explicit racial and/or gender 
preferences in ways that are equality-suppressing, rather than equality-
enhancing, courts have not displayed the same willingness to presume 
the legitimacy of these WDE, but have instead subjected them to more 
rigorous scrutiny.
275
 These cases suggest that Title VII law and 
                                                                                                                             
se that generate these benefits, but the different skills and experiences that inevitably 
accompany these different social identities. See Page, supra note 54, at 306–07. 
Accordingly, employers should be required to select directly for the skills and 
experience they desire, rather than allowing race or gender to serve as a proxy for 
them. See id. In this regard, employment decisions are different than college 
admissions decisions in which decision-makers often have to rely on limited 
information about large numbers of applicants to determine which students to admit. 
See Brief for Respondents in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 
& 02-516), 4-5 (describing grades and test scores as “imperfect predictors” of 
prospective academic success that are combined with other factors to make 
admissions decisions), Brief for Respondents in Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016) (No. 11-345), 12-14 (describing the university’s admissions decisions made 
on the basis of “a matrix where you don’t know who’s who.  Because once they’ve 
made a score, you become a number.”) 
272
 See supra Part III.A.3–4. 
273
 See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text. 
274
 Id.  See generally Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas 
Standard, supra note 5. 
275 See Hagan v. City of N.Y., 39 F. Supp.3d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying 
employer’s motion to dismiss finding plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that 
defendant hired minorities only to quiet complaints of discrimination and not to 
promote diversity or to resolve the underlying issues of workplace discrimination); 
Epps –Milton v. Genesee Intermed. Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 5817015 (No. 14-11861 
(E.D. Mich.) (allowing plaintiff to proceed on race discrimination claim where allege 
hired because African American and solely “for appearance of diversity” but then 
subjected to differential treatment than white peers); Blakely v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 
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doctrine can distinguish between WDE that are equality-enhancing, 
and those that are instead equality-suppressing  by harming them.
276
  
 
Managerialization of law theory suggests that the process of 
normative isomorphism is bi-directional, and just as EEO law has 
become managerialized by WDE so too WDE can become more 
legalized as Title VII law is interpreted and applied to proscribe those 
WDE that incur harms to women and racial/ethnic minorities.
277
 Title 
VII law and doctrine have already proven capable of identifying and 
signaling to employers the boundaries between WDE that are equality-
enhancing and those that are instead equality-suppressing.
278
 By 
adopting standards that reflect a proscription on the use of explicit 
racial or gender preferences as a part of WDE, and through continued 
targeted enforcement against employers who express a commitment 
only to “surface diversity,” while generally continuing to approve of 
WDE that embody a commitment to “core diversity,” Title VII law 
and doctrine can ensure that it has the same normative influence on the 
managerial practice of diversity that managerial practice has had on 
EEO law.
279
 
                                                                                                                             
2014 WL 4261239 (No. 2:10 CV 342 (N.D. Ind.) (denying summary judgment to 
employer on white female plaintiff’s claim that she was fired for refusing to refrain 
from hiring black employees and instead increase hiring of white employees to 
“diversify” the store). 
276
 Several cases involving minorities who were harmed by explicitly race-based 
employment decisions have resulted in favorable decisions for plaintiffs. See, e.g., 
Frank v. Xerox, 347 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2003) (reversing grant of summary judgment 
for employer finding that employees raised triable issue of fact regarding whether 
the employer’s diversity plan limiting promotional opportunities because Blacks 
were “overrepresented” in certain job categories was unlawful); Lomack v. Newark, 
463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing judgment for employer and entering 
judgment for employees who were involuntarily transferred in order eliminate 
segregation in fire houses); Sinio v. McDonalds Corp., 2007 WL 869553 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (denying summary judgment for employer and finding triable issue of fact on 
whether diversity efforts that helped African American employees but not Asian 
female plaintiff was lawful). 
277
 Edelman, When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at 902–03. 
278
 See supra notes 275-276 and accompanying text. 
279
 This normative isomorphic force has already been demonstrated, for instance, in 
the area of sexual harassment law where cases like Burling Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), have 
established a standard of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment where 
employers fail to prevent and promptly correct workplace harassment.  These cases 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Progressive scholars have often been the fiercest critics of 
WDE, believing them to be fundamentally in tension with the 
egalitarian goals that underlie Title VII. This critique may be 
misguided, not only normatively when WDE are viewed in the context 
of their EEO origins, but also descriptively in view of the benefits that 
often accrue to women and racial minorities from WDE, which 
include expanded employment opportunities and more inclusive 
workplaces. Rather than viewing WDE as antagonistic to the project 
of workplace equality, therefore, progressives ought to recognize 
WDE for their potential, if appropriately circumscribed by Title VII 
law and doctrine, to aid in securing the long sought ideal of workplace 
equality. In this regard, the focus of Title VII law and doctrine should 
not be on proscribing the instrumental justifications for WDE, but on 
policing the boundaries between those WDE that are equality-
enhancing and those that are, or have the potential to be, equality-
suppressing.  By approving of the former and signaling disapproval of 
the latter, Title VII can prevent WDE from incurring the kinds of 
harms that most concern progressive scholars and operate not only in 
service to businesses’ legitimate instrumental concerns but also aid in 
the advancement of workplace equality. 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
have given rise to the near universal adoption by employers of anti-harassment 
policies (and in many cases training) that seek to ensure compliance with this 
standard. Whether or not these policies are effective in preventing and correcting 
workplace harassment, see Edelman, When Organizations Rule, supra note 150, at 
934 (questioning the efficacy of these policies in practice), the legal standards 
developed in these cases have certainly influenced managerial practice in this regard.  
